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ABSTRACT

The EU's newly acquired competence over foreign
investment poses largely unprecedented legal challenges: the
Union's unique structure and functioning are bound to raise
questions about the traditionalformat of internationalinvestorState arbitration.Anticipating these challenges, the European
Commission has proposed a Regulation on managing the
financial responsibility that arises out of such arbitrations;a
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revised version of this proposal was adopted by the European
Parliament and the Council of the European Union. After
outlining the contemporary internationalinvestment regime, as
well as the relevant aspects of the EU legal system, this Article
scrutinizes three problematic issues under international law
that arise from the Regulation: respondent status in
internationalarbitralproceedings,attributionof treatment, and
compliance with the final award. This Article also discusses the
means of recourse open to EU Member States dissatisfied with
the EU's performance as respondent or its apportionment of
financial responsibility.
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I. INTRODUCTION

In 2012, foreign direct investment (FDI) flow into the European
Union (EU) amounted to nearly 260 billion U.S. dollars, representing
close to a fifth of total investment flows globally.' In the same year,
investment stock in the EU was 7.8 trillion U.S. dollars, accounting
for over 34 percent of global investment. 2 In light of these numbers, it
is of crucial-indeed even global-importance that the EU acquired
exclusive competence over FDI-which previously rested with its
Member States-through the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in
2009.3
As a result, international investment agreements (IIAs)
protecting the rights of foreign investors in the EU-and EU
investors abroad-will now be negotiated and concluded by the EU,
on behalf of itself, as well as on behalf of its Member States. One such
example is provided by the ongoing negotiations for a Transnational
Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) between the EU and the
4
U.S.-described as "the biggest bilateral trade deal ever negotiated."
Considering the profound impact of this transfer of competences,
however, there is an alarming degree of uncertainty regarding its
practical implications. Any given foreign investment in the EU will

U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEv. (UNCTAD), WORLD INVESTMENT
1.
REPORT 2013, at 213, U.N. Sales No. E.13.II.D.5 (2013), available at
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2013_en.pdf [http://perma.cc/A4K2.GNYQ]
(last visited Jan. 3, 2014) (archived Sept. 15, 2013).
Id. at 217.
2.
Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty
3.
Establishing the European Community, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 1 [hereinafter
Lisbon Treaty]. Lisbon Treaty art. 2(158) amended the Treaty establishing the
European Community - renamed Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
[hereinafter TFEU] with Lisbon Treaty art. 2(1) - to place foreign direct investment
under the common commercial policy, which is exclusive EU competence: TFEU art.
207, in conjunction with TFEU art. 3(1)(e). The consolidated versions of the Treaty on
European Union [hereinafter TEU] and the TFEU are available at 2012 O.J. (C 326) 13
and 47, respectively. Unless otherwise indicated, references to the TEU and the TFEU
are to these current versions of the treaties. It is also to be noted, however, that the
precise contours of the EU's investment competence are still unclear, with some even
raising the question of to what extent this competence is indeed exclusive. See, e.g.,

Nikos Lavranos, In Defence of Member States' BITs Gold Standard: The Regulation
1219/2012 Establishinga TransitionalRegime for Existing Extra-EUBITs -A Member
State's Perspective, TRANSNAT'L DISP. MGMT., Mar. 2013, at 11.

Post Article Describing Trade Between EU Member States and the United
4.
http://ec.europa.eultrade/policy/countries-andStates, EUROPEANCOMMISSION.COM,
regions/countries/united-states [http://perma.cc/LQT8-N2D2] (last visited Jan. 3, 2014)
(archived Sept. 15, 2013).
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necessarily be situated in the territory of an EU Member State (or in
that of several),5 subject to the authority of not only the EU, but also
of that Member State. Therefore, if an investor's rights are breached,
it may be difficult to determine who is responsible: the EU or the
individual Member State. This is particularly so considering that in
many-if not most-of the fields where regulatory conduct may affect
the rights of investors, both the EU and its Member States have
certain competences. In addition, even when a specific measure is
adopted at the European level, Member States may have a
considerable margin of discretion in the way they implement them. 6
Thus the interaction between the international rules on
responsibility-attribution, in particular-and the EU system of
"executive federalism," where almost all EU measures are carried out
by Member States, may prove to be problematic. This interaction
might lead to a situation where the Union may rarely be held
responsible for any action on the international plane, since its rules
are mostly carried out by Member State organs, which would imply
that the Member States are held solely responsible, even though they
may not have enacted the offensive rules. A solution would be to link
responsibility to rule-making competence rather than to actual
conduct-an approach currently put forward by the European
Commission.
Anticipating difficulties in determining responsibility of the EU
and/or its Member States, the EU Commission put forward a
Regulation on managing financial responsibility arising out of
investment arbitrations in 2012 (the Proposed Regulation).7 After
much discussion and several amendments, the European Parliament
and the Council of the EU adopted the Regulation in 2014 (the
Regulation), in accordance with the EU's ordinary legislative
procedure. 8 This article scrutinizes the Regulation through the

5.
Unless otherwise indicated, references throughout the article to an EU
Member State's role are understood to include the possibility of multiple Member
States' involvement.
6.
Although not all European measures leave a margin of discretion to
member states, see TFEU, supra note 5, art. 288, most EU legislation is done in the
form of directives, which do leave such a margin. As such, these are also the most likely
to be problematic in potential investment arbitration cases, see Thomas Henquet,
International Investment and the European Union: An Uneasy Relationship, in
INVESTMENT LAW WITHIN INTERNATIONAL LAW: INTEGRATIONIST PERSPECTIVES 375,
384 (Freya Baetens ed., 2013).
7.
Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council
establishing a framework for managing financial responsibility linked to investor-state
dispute settlement tribunals established by international agreements to which the
European Union is party, COM (2012) 335 final (June 21, 2012) [hereinafter Proposed
Regulation], http://trade.ec.europa.euldoclib/does/2012/june/tradoc_149567.pdf [http://
perma.cc/JNC-3LVZ] (last visited Jan. 3, 2014) (archived Sept. 15, 2013).
8.
See European Parliament legislative resolution of 16 April 2014 on the
proposalfor a regulation of the European Parliamentand of the Council establishinga
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following structure: Part II outlines the contemporary international
investment regime as well as the relevant aspects of the EU legal
system; Part III analyzes the three problematic issues, namely
respondent status in arbitral proceedings, attribution of treatment,
and compliance with the final award; Part IV discusses the means of
recourse open to EU Member States dissatisfied with either the EU's
performance as respondent or with the EU's apportionment of
financial responsibility.

II. THE EU AND THE IIA SYSTEM: SQUARE PEG, ROUND HOLE?

A. The InternationalSystem of Investment Protection
The European Union and the current system of investment
protection both trace back to the years following World War II. After
the war, many areas of international law underwent major
multilateral efforts of regulation, such as the 1947 General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which later formed the
9
basis of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Unlike in the field of
trade, however, no major multilateral agreement was concluded to
regulate investment: the only attempt to establish such an agreement
was the 1948 Havana Charter, which included a brief provision on
10
investment protection but never entered into force. This was largely
framework for managing financial responsibility linked to investor-state dispute
settlement tribunals established by international agreements to which the European
Union is party, COM (2012) 0335 Ordinary legislative procedure: first reading (2012)
(showing the original resolution); Position of the European Parliamentadopted at first
reading on 16 April 2014 with a view to the adoption of Regulation (EU) No ... /2014 of
the European Parliamentand of the Council establishing a framework for managing
financial responsibility linked to investor -to -state dispute settlement tribunals
established by internationalagreements to which the European Union is party, Apr. 16,
2014, available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type-TA&reference=P7(last
[http://perma.cc/7AUS-PRPF]
TA-2014-0419&language=EN&ring-A7-2013-0124
visited June 11, 2014) (archived Sept. 15, 2013) (showing the preliminary position);
Regulation (EU) No. 912/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23
July 2014 establishing a framework for managing financial responsibility linked to
investor-to-state dispute settlement tribunals established by international agreements
to which the European Union is party, O.J. (L 257) 121-34 (Aug. 28, 2014) [hereinafter
Regulation] (showing the final agreement). For more on the ordinary legislative
procedure, see infra note 49 and accompanying text.
See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 55 U.N.T.S.
9.
187 [hereinafter GATT] (including 24 Members as signatories); see also Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 3.
See Havana Charter for an' International Trade Organization, Mar. 24,
10.
1948, U.N. Conference on Trade and Employment, U.N. Doc. E/CONF.2/78 (Apr. 1948)
(providing for investment protection); on the history of investment treaty law, see
generally ANDREW NEWCOMBE & LLUIS PARADELL, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INVESTMENT
TREATIES 1-73 (2009) (discussing the Havana Charter at 19-20). On the history and
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due to the lack of support from the United States for the project.
Given the isolationist tendencies prevailing at the time in the U.S.
Senate, and in view of the political damage should it formally refuse
to ratify, President Truman decided not to put the Havana Charter
on the Senate agenda."
Despite-or perhaps precisely because of-this lack of consensus
about the necessity and the terms of such an all-encompassing
multilateral agreement, developed states became increasingly
concerned about the protection of their investors abroad. This was, in
large part, due to developing countries' reiterated assertions of
permanent sovereignty over natural resources and a concomitant
wave of expropriations and nationalizations.12 Consequently, instead
of a multilateral framework, a system of predominantly bilateral
agreements started developing from the 1960s and onward, with IIAs
that either took the form of free-standing bilateral investment
treaties (BITs), or of investment chapters within broader agreements.
The latter are most commonly Free Trade Agreements (FTAs)-such
as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)-but may
also include other types of treaties, such as the Energy Charter
Treaty, which is a broad agreement regulating the energy sector in its
various aspects.' 3 In the 1990s, there was another attempt at
creating an overarching regulatory framework, in the form of the socalled Multilateral Agreement on Investment, drafted under the
auspices of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development and initially strongly backed by the United States14
However, non-governmental organizations expressed concerns that
the proposed agreement would unduly constrain the ability of host
states to regulate matters such as labor conditions, so in the face of
mounting public pressure, governments ultimately abandoned the
project.15 Meanwhile, the number of IIAs continued to grow over the
basics of investment law, see generally RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER,
PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW (2008); JESWALD W. SALACUSE, THE
LAW OF INVESTMENT TREATIES 1-3 (2010); M. SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW
ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT (3d ed. 2012).

11.
Daniel Drache, The Short but Significant Life of the International Trade
Organization:Lessons for Our Time, 6-7 (CSGR Working Paper No. 62/00, Nov. 2000)
(explaining that Truman withdrew support for political reasons).
12.
See, e.g., DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 12, at 14-15 (explaining why
states wanted to protect investors); NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 12, at 18-19,
26-27 (emphasizing natural resource concessions).
13.
See North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992,
32 I.L.M. 289 (1993); Energy Charter Treaty, Dec. 17, 1994, 2080 U.N.T.S. 95
(regulating energy investments, free trade in energy materials, freedom of energy
transit, environmental impact, and dispute resolution).
14.
See, e.g., NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 12, at 55 (describing the
Multilateral Agreement on Investment).
15.
See, e.g., CAMPBELL MCLACHLAN, LAURENCE SHORE & MATTHEW WEINIGER,
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT ARBITRATION: SUBSTANTIVE PRINCIPLES 219 (2008);
GUNTER METZGES, NGO-KAMPAGNEN UND IHR EINFLUSS AUF INTERNATIONAL
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decades, particularly in the 1990s and 2000s, resulting in nearly
3,200 agreements that are currently in force, of which over 2,800 are
BITs.16
HAs are based on the rationale that the protection of
investments will stimulate the flow of capital and technology, as well
as the economic development of the contracting parties." To this end,
these treaties stipulate a number of substantive standards, notably
19
full protection and security,' 8 fair and equitable treatment, the

VERHANDLUNGEN: DAS MULTILATERAL AGREEMENT ON INVESTMENT (MAI) UND DIE
1997 OECD ANTI-BRIBERY CONVENTION IM VERGLEICH (2006); Jucgen Kurtz, NGOs,

the Internet and International Economic Policy Making: the Failure of the OECD
Multilateral Agreement on Investment, 3 MELB. J. INT'L L. 213, 225-26 (2002)
(explaining the role NGOs played in the abandonment of the MAI); Mathias Albert &
Stephan Hessler, Dos Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAM): ein Beispiel fur
UND
ORGANISATIONEN
INTERNATIONALE
2
in
governance"?,
"failed
REGELUNGSBEREICHE 381 (Peter Nahamowitz & Ridiger Voigt eds., 2002); Nii Lante
Wallace-Bruce, The MultilateralAgreement on Investment: An Indecent Proposal and
Not Learning the Lessons of History, 2 J. WORLD INVESTMENT 53 (2001) (describing the
abandonment of the MAI); Andrew Walter, Unravelling the Faustian Bargain: NonState Actors and the MultilateralAgreement on Investment, in NON-STATE ACTORS IN
WORLD POLITICS 150-68 (Daphne Josselin & William Wallace eds., 2001).
UNCTAD, supra note 3, at 101.
16.
BIT,
U.S.
Model
the
2012
preambles
of
e.g.,
the
17.
See,
7
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/1883 l.pdf [http://perma.cclL5U7-V3AA]
(archived Sept. 15, 2013) (recognizing that protecting investments stimulates economic
development); 2004 Netherlands Model BIT, http://www.rijksoverheid.nlbestanden/
27
/ibo-modelovereenkomst/ibodocumenten-en-publicaties/convenanten/2004/08/
modelovereenkomst.pdf [http://perma.cc/M2Y7-6TBP] (archived Sept. 15, 2013)
(recognizing agreement on the treatment of investments stimulates the flow of capital
and technology); 2008 German Model BIT, http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/
archive/ital025.pdf [http://perma.cc/Z4Y8-7AK8] (archived Sept. 15, 2013) (recognizing
that the encouragement and protection of investments increase prosperity); 2006
French Model BIT, http://italaw.com/documents/ModelTreatyFrance2006.pdf [http://
perma.cc/9WG8-SCMT] (last visited Jan. 3, 2014) (archived Sept. 15, 2013) (reasoning
that investments in transfers of capital and technology benefit economic development).
E.g., U.S. Model BIT, supra note 19, art. 5 (describing the minimum
18.
standard of treatment); NAFTA, supra note 15, art. 1105 (establishing the minimum
standard of treatment); German Model BIT, supra note 19, art. 2 (stipulating
protections). On full protection and security, see generally, for example, DOLZER &
SCHREUER, supra note 12, at 149-53 (emphasizing transparency); NEWCOMBE &
PARADELL, supra note 12, at 307-14; Todd J. Grierson-Weiler & Ian A. Laird,
Standards of Treatment, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
LAW 259 (Peter Muchlinski, Federico Ortino & Christoph Schreuer eds., 2008) (noting
how non-discrimination provisions are closely tied to minimum standard provisions).
E.g., U.S. Model BIT, supra note 19, art. 5 (providing for fair and equitable
19.
treatment); NAFTA, supra note 15, art. 1105 (providing for non-discriminatory
treatment); German Model BIT, supra note 19, art. 2 (providing for fair and equitable
treatment). See also, DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 12, at 119-49 (describing fair
and equitable treatment); Grierson-Weiler & Laird, supra note 18 (discussing fair and
equitable treatment in relation to minimum standards); NEWCOMBE & PARADELL,
supra note 12, at 255-98.
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prohibition of expropriation without compensation, 20 as well as
national 2 ' and most-favored-nation treatment. 22 Just as importantly,
although these agreements are concluded between states, they usually
provide for a procedurally novel arrangement whereby investors no
longer have to rely on their home state to espouse their claim through
diplomatic protection; investors instead have the possibility to initiate
arbitral proceedings directly against the host state for alleged
breaches of the IIA. 23 Accordingly, IIAs grant investors the right to
make use of one or more sets of arbitral procedural rules. 24 The vast
majority of HAs refer disputes to the International Centre for
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), whose proceedings are
governed by the Convention on the Settlement of Investment
Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (ICSID
Convention). 25 At the same time, the Arbitration Rules devised by the
United Nations Commission on International Trade , Law
20.
E.g., U.S. Model BIT, supra note 19, art. 6 (prohibiting expropriation
without compensation); NAFTA, supra note 15, art. 1110 (requiring compensation at
fair market value); German Model BIT, supra note 19, art. 4 (prohibiting expropriation
without compensation). Expropriation may be direct or indirect; both forms are
prohibited. See, e.g., DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 12, at 89-118 (describing
expropriation); NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 12, at 321-98; August Reinisch,
Expropriation, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 407,

supra note 20.
21.
National treatment entails "treatment no less favorable than that [the host
state] accords, in like circumstances, to its own investors." E.g., U.S. Model BIT, supra
note 19, art. 3; NAFTA, supra note 15, art. 1102; German Model BIT art. 3, supra note
19 (providing for national treatment). See also e.g., DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note
12, at 178-86 (describing national treatment); NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 12,
at 147-91.
22.
Most favored nation treatment entails "treatment no less favorable than
that [the host state] accords, in like circumstances, to investors of any non-Party [i.e.
any third state]." E.g., U.S. Model BIT, supra note 19, art. 4; NAFTA, supra note 15,
art. 1103; German Model BIT, supra note 19, art. 3 (providing for most-favored-nation
treatment); see also, e.g., DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 12, at 186-91 (describing
most-favored-nation treatment); NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 12, at 193-232;
Pia Acconci, Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 363, supra note 20.

23.
E.g., U.S. Model BIT, supra note 19, Section B (outlining the process for the
arbitration proceedings); NAFTA, supra note 15, Chapter Eleven, Section B,
(establishing a mechanism for settling investment disputes); Netherlands Model BIT,
supra note 19, art. 9 (requiring consent for contracting parties to submit to
arbitration).
24.
For an overview, see generally Freya Baetens, ProceduralIssues relating to
Shared Responsibility in Arbitral Proceedings, 4 J. INT'L DIsP. SETTLEMENT 319 (2013)
(describing six sets of procedural rules investors can use).
25.
See Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States
and Nationals of Other States, Mar. 18, 1965, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 (governing the ICSID).
For more on the ICSID Convention, see generally CHRISTOPH H. SCHREUER WITH
LORETTA

MALINTOPPI,

AUGUST

REINISCH

&

ANTHONY

SINCLAIR,

THE

ICSID

CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY (2d ed., 2011). Some BITs refer to ICSID only. E.g.,
Netherlands Model BIT, supra note 19, art. 9 (referring parties to the ICSID); French
Model BIT, supra note 19, art. 7 (referring parties to the ICSID).
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(UNCITRAL) are widely recognized as "the procedural benchmark for
ad hoc (i.e. non-institutional) international arbitrations." 26 Although

UNCITRAL arbitrations are ad hoc, arbitral institutions like the

27
Court of Arbitration often administer them.
Permanent
Furthermore, IIAs may refer investors to institutions originally
established for commercial arbitration (i.e., arbitration between two
private parties, as opposed to a private and a state party), but which
now also conduct investor-state arbitrations under their respective
rules. Examples of the latter are the Stockholm Chamber of
Commerce (SCC) 28 and the International Chamber of Commerce
(ICC).29 Investment treaty arbitration has become a highly popular

form of recourse in recent years, with the total number of known

pending and concluded cases totaling more than 500 by now. 30
Generally, about two-thirds of investment disputes are brought before

Baetens, supra note 26, at 320. The UNCITRAL Rules were originally
26.
developed in 1976 and revised in 2010. See U.N. GAOR, 31st Sess., Supp. No. 17, UN
Doc. A/31/17 (1976), Chapter V, Section C, reprinted in 7 UNCITRAL Y.B. 22 (1976);
U.N. GAOR, 65th Sess., Supp. No. 17, UN Doc. A/65/17 (2010), Annex I [hereinafter
UNCITRAL Rules). The General Assembly recommended the use of UNCITRAL Rules
in G.A. Res. 31/98, UN Doc. AIRES/31/98 (Dec. 15, 1976), and G.A. Res. 65/22, UN Doc.
A/RES/65/22 (Dec. 6, 2010). Arbitration under UNCITRAL rules is listed as an option
by, for example, U.S. Model BIT, supranote 19, art. 24(3)(c); German Model BIT, supra
note 19, art. 10(2)(3).
See Recent Developments in Investor-State Dispute Settlement, UNCTAD,
27.
May 2013 [hereinafter UNCTAD Dispute Settlement], at 3, available at
[http://perma.cc/6842http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/webdiaepcb20l3d3-en.pdf
2FCN] (archived Sept. 15, 2013) (stating the majority of cases have been brought under
the ICSID). The ICSID, SCC, and ICC also administer UNCITRAL arbitrations. See
The SCC Experience of Investment Arbitration under UNCITRAL Rules, SCC, Oct.
2012, available at http://www.sccinstitute.com/filearchive/4/44668/UNCITRAL
Disputes_-The SCC Experience AM.pdf [http://perma.cc/9UD3-JFWZ] (archived Sept.
15, 2013); ICC, ICC to act as appointing authority, available at http://www.iccwbo.org/
products-and-serviceslarbitration-and-adr/appointing-authority [http://perma.cc/FTC8A4TA] (archived Sept. 15, 2013) (allowing parties to use the ICC as an arbitral
institution); The ICSID Caseload - Statistics, ICSID, Issue 2013-1, at 9, available at
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=ICSIDDocRH&actionVal
=ShowDocument&CaseLoadStatistics=True&language=English4 1 [http://perma.cc/
Y8VF-YSXT] (last visited Jan. 3, 2014) (archived Sept. 15, 2013) (showing that the
ICSID provides administrative assistance for UNCITRAL arbitrations).
According to the SCC's own statistics, "64 countries are signatories to BITs
28.
that refer to the SCC in their dispute resolution clauses." SCC, supra note 29, at 4.
Others list the SCC as an option. German Model BIT, supra note 19, art. 10(2)(4); and
the Energy Charter Treaty, supra note 15, art. 26(4)(c).
E.g., German Model BIT, supra note 19, art. 10(2)(4) (listing the ICC as an
29.
option).
UNCTAD Dispute Settlement, supra note 29, at 3. Since most arbitration
30.
fora do not maintain a public registry of claims, UNCTAD estimates that the total
number of cases is likely to be higher.
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the ICSID, which has currently more than 170 arbitrations on its
docket. 31
Developments since the end of World War II, therefore, have
resulted in an established system of HAs (mostly BITs) which has
reached quite unprecedented levels of efficiency and which, because of
this, is increasingly popular with global business.
B. The European Union System
World War II also provided the impetus for the economic
integration of Europe. Principal was the desire to bring the coal and
steel production of Germany and France-the basis of
militarization-under common international control.3 2 The call for an
"ever closer union," 33 resulted in the establishment of the European
Coal and Steel Community, the European Atomic Energy
Community, and the European Economic Community, together
forming the European Communities, in the 1950s.34 The latter, with
the addition of cooperation in the fields of foreign and security policy,
as well as justice and home affairs, eventually became the European
Union in 1993.35

31.
Id. at 2-4. About a quarter of cases are brought before ad hoc tribunals
under UNCITRAL rules, and the remainder before the SCC, ICC, and similar
institutions. See id. For currently pending cases, see List of Pending Cases, ICSID,
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=GenCaseDtsRH&action
Val=ListPending (last visited Jan. 3, 2014) [http://perma.cc/9TE4-XNW8] (archived
Oct. 8, 2014).
32.
See, e.g., JOHN FAIRHURST, LAW OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 4-5 (9th ed.
2012).
33.
Preamble to the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community,
Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11.
34.
Treaty Between the Federal Republic of Germany, the Kingdom of Belgium,
the French Republic, the Italian Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg and the
Kingdom of the Netherlands Instituting the European Coal and Steel Community, Apr.
18, 1951, 261 U.N.T.S. 143; Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy
Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 169; Treaty Establishing the European
Economic Community, supra note 35. The Treaty establishing the European Economic
Community was renamed "Treaty establishing the European Community" [hereinafter
EC Treaty] in 1993, Treaty on European Union, art. G(A)(1), Feb. 7, 1992, 1757
U.N.T.S. 3, and renamed again to "Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union"
in 2009, Lisbon Treaty, supra note 5, art. 2(1). The founding treaties-particularly the
TEU and the TFEU-have been amended several times over the years; for the latest
consolidated versions, see supranote 5. For more on the history of the European Union,
see, for example, FAIRHURST, supra note 34, at 4-54. The predecessor organizations
were originally established by six states, but there are now 28 Member States of the
European Union (Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic,
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia,
Lithuania, Luxemburg, Malta, The Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia,
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom).
35.
Treaty on European Union, supra note 36, art. A. The TEU established a
"three-pillar system," where the European Communities, Justice and Home Affairs,
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Over the years, the institutions at the European level acquired
progressively more competences in the economic field and beyond, as
the level of integration deepened and its objectives broadened to
embrace social, environmental, and political goals.3 6 The increasing
depth of EU integration-at least in economic terms-is best
illustrated through what are commonly known as the four levels of
economic integration, where each level incorporates and supersedes
the previous one. The four levels are (1) the free trade area, (2) the
customs union, (3) the common market, and (4) the economic union.
The first level (the free trade area)is the level at which Member
States have eliminated trade barriers among themselves, but each of
them still sets its own customs rates for imports from outside the
area. There are about a dozen multilateral free trade areas around
the world-including the North American Free Trade Area between
Canada, Mexico, and the United States, established by NAFTA-and
hundreds more bilateral free trade agreements. 37 The agreements
concluded under the auspices of the WTO also have the elimination of
trade barriers as their aim.38 At the second level (the customs union),
members have set uniform customs standards for imports from
outside the union-such as the East African Customs Union between
Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi.3 9 The third level
and Foreign and Security Policy each constituted a "pillar" of the EU, but the latter two
functioned at the intergovernmental level. The Lisbon Treaty, supra note 5, art. 1(55),
finally gave international legal personality to the European Union as such. TEU, supra
note 5, art. 47.
See, e.g., FAIRHURST, supra note 34, at 9-49.
36.
NAFTA, supra note 15; see also, e.g., Dom. Rep.-Central America-U.S.
37.
Free Trade Agreement, Aug. 5, 2004, available at http://www.ustr.gov/tradeagreements/free-trade-agreements/cafta-dr-dominican-republic-central-america-fta
final-text [http://perma.cc/AL5J-E2PS] (archived Sept. 15, 2013); U.S.-Australia Free
Trade Agreement, May 18, 2004, available at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/
[http://perma.cc/H98K-BYE2] (archived
free-trade-agreements/australian-fta/final-text
Sept. 15, 2013); Free Trade Agreement Between the Republic of India and the
Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, Dec. 28, 1998, available at
http://www.commerce.nic.in/trade/international taindsl_1.asp [http://perma.cc/RS62CM5H] (archived Sept. 15, 2013) (creating free trade agreements). For more examples,
see WTO Regional Trade Agreements Information System, WTO.ORG, http://
rtais.wto.orgUI/PublicAllRTAList.aspx (last visited Jan. 3, 2014).
E.g., GATT, supra note 11 (aiming to reduce tariffs and other barriers to
38.
trade); General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 183
[hereinafter GATS] (desiring to liberalize trade services); WTO Agreement on TradeRelated Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods,
Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS] (desiring to reduce blocks to
trade); WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, 1868
U.N.T.S. 186 (desiring to expand liberalization of trade). For more examples, see WTO
Documents, WTO.ORG, http://www.wto.org/english/docse/does e.htm [http://perma.cc/
7J2Q-RREY] (last visited Jan. 3, 2014) (archived Sept. 15, 2013).
East African Community Secretariat, Protocol on the Establishment of the
39.
East African Customs Union, Mar. 2, 2004, available at http://www.customs.eac.int/
index.php?option=com-docman&task=doc_view&gid=1&tmpl=component&format=raw
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(the common-market) is the level at which the free movement of not
only goods, but also production factors within the market, has been
ensured. For example, the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR)
was established in 1991 by the Treaty of Asunci6n, which was later
amended and updated by the 1994 Treaty of Ouro Preto. 40
MERCOSUR has five full members, namely Argentina, Brazil,
Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela. Finally, the fourth level (the
economic union) is the level that entails a harmonized fiscal and
monetary policy, usually accompanied by a common currency (i.e., a
monetary union). 41 The decision to build such an economic and
monetary union in the framework of European integration was
formalized in the early 1990s and has been (partially) implemented
since 2002.42 Currently eighteen out of the twenty-eight EU Member
States are part of the "eurozone." 43 As a result of this deep

&Itemid=164 [http://perma.cc/RH8H-CN8E] (archived Sept. 15, 2013) (setting customs
standards); Treaty Establishing a Central African Economic and Customs Union, Dec.
8, 1964, 4 I.L.M. 699 (1965) (setting customs standards); Agreement on Cooperation
and Customs Union between the European Economic Community and the Republic of
San Marino, Dec. 16, 1991, 2002 O.J. (L 84) 43 (setting up a customs union). For more
examples, see WTO Regional Trade Agreements Information System, supra note 39.
40.
See Treaty for the Establishment of a Common Market between the
Argentine Republic, the Federative Republic of Brazil, the Republic of Paraguay and
the Eastern Republic of Uruguay, Mar. 26, 1991, 2140 U.N.T.S. 257 [hereinafter Treaty
of Asunci6n]; Additional Protocol to the Asunci6n Treaty on the Institutional Structure
of Mercosur, Dec. 17, 1994, 2145 U.N.T.S. 300 [hereinafter Ouro Preto Protocol]
(providing for production factors and goods). See also, e.g., the Treaty establishing the
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, Nov. 5, 1993, 33 I.L.M. 1072 (1994);
Protocol on the Establishment of the East African Community Common Market, Nov.
20, 2009, available at http://www.eac.int/index.php?option=com-doeman&task=doc
download&gid=362&Itemid=163 [http://perma.cc/7GP6-T9S9] (archived Sept. 15,
2013); Agreement Establishing the Common External Tariff for the Caribbean
Common Market, July 4, 1973, 946 U.N.T.S. 76 (covering production factors and
goods). For more examples, see WTO Regional Trade Agreements Information System,
supranote 39.
41.
In the case of the EU, see TEU art. 3(4), supra note 5 (establishing the
euro); TFEU, supra note 5, arts. 119-44 (setting out the economic and monetary
policy).
42.
On the stages of the economic and monetary union, see, for example
Economic
and
Monetary
Union
(EMU),
EUROPEANCENTRALBANK.COM,
http://www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/history/emu/html/index.en.html
[http://perma.cc/M2VM4EAN] (last visited Jan. 3, 2014) (archived Sept. 15, 2013) (showing the development of
the EMU); see also supra note 43 (describing the development of the EU). On plans for
an even more complete implementation, see European Council, Towards a Genuine
Economic and Monetary Union, Dec. 5, 2012, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/
uedocs/cms.Data/docs/pressdataenlec/134069.pdf [http://perma.cc/G4RC-PD7U] (last
visited Jan. 3, 2014) (archived Sept. 15, 2013). For more on the economic and monetary
union in general, see, for example Francis Snyder, EMU - Integration and
Differentiation: Metaphor for European Union, in THE EVOLUTION OF EU LAW 687
(Paul Craig & Grainne de Burca eds., 2d ed. 2011).
43.
These 18 countries are Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg, Malta, Portugal, Slovakia,
Slovenia, Spain and The Netherlands. See The Euro, EUROPEANCENTRALBANK.COM,
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integration and the extensive transfer of powers from the national to
the European level, the EU is generally considered to form a sui
generis category among international organizations, having distinct
supranationalcharacteristics.44
Nevertheless, no matter how unique the EU as a legal entity
may be, one has to bear in mind that it is still an organization of
enumerated powers, i.e., it can exercise only those powers which have
45
been conferred upon it by its Member States. In the case of foreign
investment regulation, the Member States enacted this conferral
through the Lisbon Treaty, which amended the Treaty on the
46
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) to stipulate that under
TFEU article 207(1), "[t]he common commercial policy shall be based
on uniform principles, particularly with regard to .

.

. foreign direct

investment," while TFEU Article 3(1)(e) states that "[t]he Union shall
have exclusive competence in the [area of] common commercial
policy." In accordance with the terms of TFEU Article 2(1), once an
area has been designated as falling under exclusive EU competence,
the Member States only have competence inasmuch as the EU
47
transfers it back to them.
In the areas within EU competence, legislation is usually
proposed by the European Commission, then jointly decided upon by
48
the Council and the European Parliament. Within the institutional
dynamics of the EU, the Commission tends to be seen as representing
the interests of the Union, while the Council acts for the Member
States, and the Parliament-the only directly elected EU organ49
In
gives citizens the opportunity to influence decision-making.
"executive
the
of
equivalent
the
roughly
is
Commission
the
addition,
http://www.ecb.europa.euleurolhtml/index.en.html [http://perma.cc/85NG-KYKU] (last
visited Jan. 3, 2014) (archived Sept. 15, 2013).
See, e.g., European Parliament Directorate-General for External Policies,
44.
Responsibility in Investor-State Arbitration in the EU, Dec. 2012 [hereinafter EP
9, http://www.europarl.europa.eulcommittees/fr/studiesdownload.html
at
Study],
?1anguageDocument=EN&file=79450 [http://perma.cclV5E6-L433] (archived Sept. 15,
2013) (distinguishing the EU from other international organizations); August Reinisch,
The EU on the Investment Path - Quo Vadis Europe? The Future of EU BITs and other
Investment Agreements, 34 (Mar. 20, 2013), available at http//ssrn.comlabstract=2236192
[http://perma.cc/XF9S-WF63] (last visited Jan. 3, 2014) (archived Sept. 15, 2013)
(describing the EU as "a highly integrated supranational organization").
TEU, supra note 5, art. 5(2).
45.
Formerly the EC Treaty. See supra note 36.
46.
TFEU, supra note 5, art. 2(1); exclusive competences are listed in TFEU
47.
art. 3. There are also a number of so-called "shared competences," where the Member
States may exercise their competence to the extent that the EU does not. See TFEU,
supra note 5, arts. 2(2), 4.
This is the so-called "ordinary legislative procedure." See TEU, supra note
48.
5, arts. 14(1), 16(1), 17(2) (setting out the legislative procedure); TFEU, supra note 5,
arts. 289(1), 294 (setting out procedures).
See TEU, supra note 5, art. 17 on the Commission; art. 16 on the Council;
49.
and art. 14 on the Parliament. See also, e.g., FAIRHURST, supranote 32, at 89-127.
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branch" of a state, and is thus also the institution representing the
EU in its external relations with non-Member States (third states.) 5 0
Binding measures within the EU can take the form of
regulations, directives, or decisions. 5' Regulations clearly set out the
goal to be attained by all Member States, as well as the precise means
through which such goal is to be reached. 52 Decisions bear essentially
the same characteristics, except that they address a specific Member
State, or group of Member States.58 Most EU legislation, however,
takes place through directives, which set out the objective to be
achieved, but leave it up to the discretion of the Member States to
decide through which means they will attain that objective. 5 4 In sum,
even in areas falling under EU competence, Member States tend to
have a considerable margin of discretion in implementing such
policies.
C. EU Meets Investment Law
For most of the European Union's existence, it did not have
competence over FDI.5 5 Member States each concluded their own
investment treaties, amounting altogether to approximately 1,200
BITs with third states by the time the Lisbon Treaty entered into
force in 2009.56 At the time, the only international treaty in this field
50.
See TEU, supra note 5, arts. 17(1), 18 (giving the Commission executive
powers). The 2009 Lisbon Treaty established a "double hatted" High Representative of
the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, charged with the twofold mission to
conduct the Common Foreign and Security Policy and ensure the consistency of the
Union's external action. Furthermore, a European External Action Service (EEAS) was
created to act as the European diplomatic corps assisting the High Representative in
fulfilling his mandate. See TEU, supra note 5, art. 27(3). The EEAS was formally
established by Decision 2010/427/EU of the Council of Ministers establishing the
organization and functioning of the European External Action Service on July 26, 2010
(OJ 201/30 of Aug. 3, 2011). The EEAS was formally launched on January 1, 2011. See,
e.g., Chiara Cellerino, The New European External Action Service and the Lisbon Call
for Coherence of European External Action: Issues of Accountability and Scope, 17
COLUM. J. EUR. L. ONLINE 22 (2011) (discussing the role that the EEAS plays in dealing
with the EU's external policies).
51.
TFEU, supra note 5, art. 288. EU institutions can also adopt
recommendations and opinions, but these have no binding force.
52.
Id. para. 2.
53.
Id. para. 4.
54.
Id. para. 3.
55.
Arguably, since the entry into force of the Treaty of Nice Amending the
Treaty on European Union, and the Treaties Establishing the European Communities
and Certain Related Acts, Feb. 26, 2001, 2001 O.J. (C 80) 1, the EU has been
competent in the field of investment in services because of the third GATS mode of
transboundary services trade (commercial presence). See GATS, supra note 40, art.
I(2)(c). This was one of the reasons why in subsequent negotiations it was argued that
it was logical to also cover investment in goods manufacturing.
56.
See, e.g., EU Takes Key Step to Provide Legal Certainty for Investors
Outside Europe, EUROPEAN COMMISSION DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR TRADE (Dec. 12,
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that included the EU as a party was the Energy Charter Treaty
57
between the EU, its Member States and some fifteen third states.
The fate of agreements concluded by Member States with third
states is addressed in Regulation No. 1219/2012, which entered into
force on January 9, 2013, and laid the groundwork for the new
division of competences. 58 This Regulation divides BITs between EU
members and third states into three groups based on their date of
conclusion or entry into force.
The first group contains agreements signed before December 1,
2009. These BITs remain in force, although Member States have a
duty to notify the Commission of their existence, so as to allow the
Commission to assess "whether one or more of their provisions
constitute a serious obstacle to the negotiation or conclusion by59the
Union of bilateral investment agreements with third countries." If
that is the case, consultations are opened between the Commission
and the Member State to agree upon amendments to the treaty
provision, which are then to be renegotiated by the Member State and
the third state. 60 Furthermore, if no agreement is reached between
the Commission and the Member State after the end of the
consultations, "the Commission may . . . indicate the appropriate

measures to be taken by the Member State concerned in order to
remove the obstacles." 61 Such a lack of agreement has not occurred as
of yet, so it is still unknown how the Commission will apply this
provision in practice. Under one possible reading of the Regulation,
the phrase "may indicate the appropriate measures to be taken" could
imply that the Commission has the right to choose whether or not to
indicate measures, but once it has done so, the Member State has no
54
[http://perma.cc/6HJG2012), http://trade.ec.europa.euldolib/press/index.cfm?id=8
2013 O.J. (C 131) 2.
see
BITs,
CMZ8] (archived Sept. 15, 2014). For a list of such
See The Energy Charter Treaty, supra note 15. For more on investment
57.

under this treaty, see THOMAS ROE & MATTHEW HAPPOLD, SETTLEMENT OF
INVESTMENT DISPUTES UNDER THE ENERGY CHARTER TREATY, 100-03, 171-85 (2011).

Regulation (EU) No. 1219/2012 of the European Parliament and of the
58.
Council of 12 December 2012, 2012 O.J. (L 351) 40 [hereinafter Regulation No.
1219/2012] (establishing transitional arrangements for bilateral investment
agreements between Member States and third countries).
Id. art. 5. See also id. arts. 2-3.
59.
Id. art. 6(2).
60.
Id. art. 6(3). Whether and to what extent such an indication by the
61.
Commission is binding is not entirely clear, however. See, e.g., Lavranos, supra note 5,
at 9 ("[A] consultation procedure has been put in place in Article 6, which enables the
European Commission to discuss with the Member State concerned its problems with a
particular BIT and indicate which steps the Member State should take in order to

resolve the issue."). The use of "should" (rather than "must" or "shall") suggests that
the indication is not necessarily binding. See id. ("Of course, if no satisfactory solution

is achieved[,] the European Commission has the power to start in accordance with
Article 258 TFEU an infringement procedure against the Member State before the
[Court of Justice of the European Union]."). The Court's case law on the matter is not
quite consistent, though. See id. at 5.
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choice but to comply. This would give the Commission considerable
leverage in any round of consultations.
The second group encompasses agreements signed between
December 1, 2009 and January 9, 2013. As with the previous group of
BITs, the Commission needs to be notified of the existence of these
treaties so as to allow for an assessment of their compatibility with
EU law. 62 In addition, for this second group, the Commission has to
give its express authorization to maintain these BITs, or to let them
enter into force. Furthermore, it is interesting to note that-in a move
ostensibly designed to ensure greater consistency already in the
transitional phase-a Member State shall "inform the Commission
without undue delay of any representations made to it that a
particular measure is inconsistent with the agreement." 6 3 Moreover,
the Member State has to immediately inform the Commission of any
dispute settlement request lodged under the auspices of the BIT as
soon as it becomes aware of such a request, so as to allow "[t]he
Member State and the Commission [to] fully cooperate and take all
necessary measures to ensure an effective defence which may include,
where appropriate, the participation in the procedure by the
Commission." 64
In June 2013, the Commission was given a mandate by the
Council to enter into formal negotiations with the United States as to
reach an agreement concerning the comprehensive EU-U.S. TTIP, for
which the first round of talks took place in July 2013.65 The EU also
has ongoing negotiations on bilateral FTAs with an investment
chapter with Canada, India, Japan, Morocco, Malaysia, Thailand, and
Vietnam. 66 In October 2013, the Council of the European Union
62.
Regulation No. 1219/2012, supra note 60, art. 12.
63.
Id. art. 13(b).
64.
Id.
65.
Press Release, European Commission, Member States Endorse EU-US
Trade
and
Investment
Negotiations
(June
14,
2013),
available at
http://trade.ec.europa.euldoclib/press/index.cfm?id=918
[http://perma.cc/37LN-8KM5]
(archived Sept. 15, 2014); Press Release, European Commission, EU and US Conclude
First Round of TTIP Negotiations in Washington (July 12, 2013), available at
http://trade.ec.europa.euldoclib/press/index.cfm?id=941
[http://perma.cc/4BNH-67ST]
(archived Sept. 15, 2014).
66.
See, e.g., Memorandum from the European Commission, The EU's Bilateral
Trade and Investment Agreements - Where are We? (Oct. 18, 2013), available at
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-releaseMEMO-13-915 en.htm [http://perma.ccNV7MX-Y7J3]
(archived Sept. 15, 2014). In fact, the terms of the agreement with Canada are largely
finalized. A "technical summary" of its main points was made public by the Canadian
authorities in late October 2013. See Technical Summary of Final Negotiated
Outcomes: Canada-European Union Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement,
Canada's Economic Action Plan, http://www.actionplan.gc.ca/sites/default/files/pdfs/cetatechnicalsummary.pdf (last visited Sept. 15, 2014) [http://perma.cc/G7TQ-J59E]
(archived Oct. 25, 2014). The consolidated text of the Canada-EU Comprehensive
Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) was made public on September 26, 2014. See
Consolidated
CETA
Text,
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/september/
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approved the opening of negotiations by the Commission on an
67
However, because all such
investment agreement with China.
of time, the Commission
amount
negotiations will take a considerable
states will not be
third
some
that
will have to prioritize, meaning
EU in the near
the
with
BIT
a
offered an opportunity to conclude
individual EU
protection,
future. To avoid a gap in investment
by the
authorized
if
BITs
Member States can still agree on new
in the
participate
also
may
Commission, and the Commission
68
the
by
authorized
The EU-third state BITs
negotiations.
the
form
accordingly
2013,
9,
Commission, concluded after January
1219/2012.
No.
third group of IIAs covered by Regulation
When disputes arise under the new EU-third state HAs, they
could give rise to certain legal problems. Foreign investments will
necessarily be located in the territory of one or more Member
States-and they will thus be subject to treatment not only by the EU
itself but also by the Member States. The Member States in some
cases may be acting on their own authority (possibly even contrary to
EU law), while in other instances may be acting on the instructions of
the EU. As a result, it may be unclear who is responsible for any
alleged violation of the IIA. Therefore, investors will have to
determine against whom to initiate arbitral proceedings: against the
EU or against the Member State? One can imagine that in order to
avoid the risk of choosing the "wrong" respondent, investors would
generally opt for bringing a claim against both. That, however, leads
to the next problem: how is it to be decided who exactly acted in
breach of the IIA? In other words, to whom is the conduct in question
attributable: to the EU, to the Member State, or even to both?
Finally, if both the EU and the Member State are found to have acted
in breach of the IIA and compensation is awarded to the investor,
how is it to be divided between the EU and the Member State? This
entails the ancillary problem that under international law, there is no
69
principle of joint and several responsibility. A tribunal will always
tradoc_152806.pdf (last visited Oct. 22, 2014) [http://perma.cc/AJ44-PAJE] (archived
Oct. 25, 2014); or Consolidated CETA Text, Ch. X, Investment, http://
www.international.gc.caltrade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acclceta-aecg/texttexte/10.aspx?lang=eng (last visited Oct. 22, 2014) [http://perma.ccYE3B-Y9QQ]
(archived Oct. 25, 2014).
Press Release, Council of the European Union, Council Approves Launch of
67.
available at http://
2013),
18,
(Oct.
China
with
Talks
Investment
See
www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/139055.pdf.
China, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/tradepolicy/countries-and-regions/
countries/china [http://perma.cc/QHQ9-LZ24] (archived Sept. 15, 2014); infra note 8.
Regulation No. 1219/2012, supra note 60, arts. 7-11.
68.
Rep. of the Int'l Law Comm'n, 53d Sess., Apr. 23-June 1, July 2-Aug. 10,
69.
2001, 317, U.N. Doc. A/56/10; GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10. (2001) [hereinafter
ARSIWA]. But see JAMES CRAWFORD, STATE RESPONSIBILITY: THE GENERAL PART 32832 (2013) (noting that private law concepts like joint and several liability have not been
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have to divide responsibility and hence compensatory duties. The
Commission put forth the Proposed Regulation on June 21, 2012 to
address the issues relating 'managing financial responsibility' arising
from arbitration under EU-third state IIAs. The European
Parliament adopted an amended form of the Regulation on April 16,
2014, and the Council of the EU adopted it on July 23, 2014.70
Following its publication in the Official Journal of the EU on August
28, 2014, the Regulation entered into force on September 17, 2014.
After a preliminary note on the legal status of such a Regulation
under international law, the following section will examine, more
closely in the light of the proposal, the questions of: respondent
status, attribution of breach, and compliance.
III. PROBLEMATIC ISSUES ARISING FROM THE REGULATION

Before delving into the issues raised by the Regulation, one
major caveat must be made: the impact of such Regulation on the
arbitral proceedings and the resulting award is conditional upon its
integral incorporation in the IIA.7 1 In other words, the Regulation
only has legal force within the EU, it cannot be relied upon as a
binding source of law in the EU's relations with third states or
investors residing in third states.7 2 Arbitrations are initiated on the
basis of a so-called "arbitration clause" in the applicable IIA whereby
both contracting states agree to submit any future disputes under the
treaty to arbitration. The state parties thereby waive their right to
immunity from jurisdiction and most often grant private foreign
investors (who are themselves not parties to the treaty) the right to
private standing, i.e., a right to launch such arbitral proceedings
directly against the state hosting the investment. The jurisdictional
limits of any arbitral tribunal are set by the arbitration clause, within
which tribunals are considered competent to decide on all matters
adopted into international law, and thus they can only play a subsidiary role in
international law).
70.
See generally Proposed Regulation, supra note 9; Regulation, supra note 10.
71.
See EP Study, supra note 46, at 22-23; Jan Kleinheisterkamp, Financial

Responsibility in the European InternationalInvestment Policy (LSE Law, Society and

Economy Working Papers 15/2013), 8, 16, available at http://www.1se.ac.uk/collections/
law/wpsfWPS2013-15_Kleinheisterkamp.pdf [http://perma.cc/ZPR7-6QTT] (archived
Oct. 8, 2014).
72.
A similar situation exists, for example, where a state displays a certain
conduct which is entirely lawful under its own domestic rules, but unlawful under
international law. When the responsibility of that State is subsequently invoked before
an international court, it cannot justify its conduct by reference to its lawfulness under
domestic law. See ARSIWA, supra note 69, art. 3, at 74 ("The characterization of an act
of a State as internationally wrongful is governed by international law. Such
characterization is not affected by the characterization of the same act as lawful by
internal law.").
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related to their own jurisdiction (this is known as la competence de la
compitence or Kompetenz-Kompetenz).7 3 As a result, the text of the
Regulation should be incorporated in the IIA. Otherwise, the IIA
must make direct recourse to the Regulation, and explicitly subject all
future arbitral proceedings under the IIA to the rules set out in the
Regulation insofar as jurisdiction is concerned. 74 That being said,
future EU IIAs will most likely include provisions giving effect to the
Regulation at the international level,7 5 therefore the rest of the
analysis in this article will proceed on this assumption.
A. Respondent Status: Whom to Sue?
The first question faced by any investor wishing to initiate
arbitral proceedings is: against whom should the claim be brought? In
other words, who is the appropriate respondent? As noted above, the
investor will most likely prefer to start proceedings against both the
EU and the Member State involved, in order to avoid wasting time
and funds suing the "wrong" respondent. Yet, having a case with a
multitude of respondents is exactly what the Regulation seeks to
avoid. This section first examines whether EU-third state IIAs are socalled "mixed agreements," i.e., agreements whereby the EU and all
its Member States are contracting parties, or whether the EU could
conclude such agreements on its own. Subsequently, the precise
terms of the European Commission's proposal regarding respondent
status are discussed, followed by an elaboration on the problems with
this proposal.
1.

Investment Agreements: Mixed or EU-only?

Since arbitrations are initiated on the basis of the IIA's
arbitration clause, arguably, claims could only be brought against a

See, e.g., Nottebohm Case (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala), 1953 I.C.J. 111,
73.
117 (Nov. 18); Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1, Decision on the Defence Motion
for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, T 18 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995); see also Kleinheisterkamp, supra note 73, at 15-16.
Stipulating in one treaty that in case of conflict, the provisions of another
74.
treaty prevail is not uncommon in international law. See, e.g., Energy Charter Treaty,
supra note 15, art. 4 (stating that in case of conflict between the Energy Charter Treaty
provisions and those of the GATT, the latter prevail).
See Kleinheisterkamp, supra note 73, at 16. ("It can ... be assumed that
75.
the Commission has the intention to include such clarification in every future EU
investment agreement, since otherwise the solution in the present draft Regulation
would [be] wholly ineffective and moot."); see also the Consolidated CETA Text, supra
note 68, art. X.20, setting up a procedure for "Determination of the respondent for
disputes with the European Union or its Member States" and stipulating that "[tihe
tribunal shall be bound by the determination made pursuant to" this procedure.
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contracting party to the treaty. The preliminary question is thus
whether only the EU will become party to these agreements, or both
the EU and its Member States?
a.

EU Competence under EU Law

The answer to this preliminary question is at least partially
found in EU law, which divides the EU's competence to regulate into
three categories: exclusive, shared, and supporting. This division
applies to internal (or, within the Member State itself) as well as
external (or, international) rulemaking. Firstly, matters that are part
of the exclusive competence of the EU, like the conclusion of treaties
and representation in dispute settlement cases, are dealt with solely
by the EU institutions (mostly the Commission). 76 For example, this
is the case with regard to the common commercial policy and ensuing
cases before the WTO Dispute Settlement Body.77 Secondly, topics for
which competence is shared between the EU and its Member States78
are subject to the conclusion of so-called mixed agreements. In
addition to the third state(s), the EU, as well as its Member States,
are parties to such agreements. An illustration of a mixed agreement
can be found in international environmental law: the EU and its
members are all parties to the UN Framework Convention on
Climate Change and its Kyoto Protocol.79 Thirdly, for issues falling
under supporting competence, the EU is not a party to any of the
relevant international agreements; at most it coordinates or

76.
TFEU, supra note 5, art. 2(1) (stating that in these matters, only the EU is
able to legislate and adopt binding acts, and thus the Member States' role is limited to
applying these acts, unless the Union authorizes them to adopt certain acts
themselves).
77.
Other areas falling under the exclusive competence of the EU are customs
union; the establishing of the competition rules necessary for the functioning of the
internal market; monetary policy for the Member States whose currency is the euro;
the conservation of marine biological resources under the common fisheries policy; and
the conclusion of international agreements when the agreement's conclusion is
provided for in a legislative act of the Union or is necessary to enable the Union to
exercise its internal competence, or in so far as the agreement's conclusion may affect
common rules or alter their scope. TFEU, supra note 5, arts. 3(1)-(2)).
78.
TFEU, supra note 5, art. 4 (stating that in these fields, the EU and its
Member States are authorized to adopt binding acts, but Member States may exercise
their competence only in so far as the EU has not exercised, or has decided not to
exercise, its own competence).
79.
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992,
1771 U.N.T.S. 107; Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change, Dec. 11, 1997, 2303 U.N.T.S. 148. Other areas of shared competence
include internal market; social policy; economic, social and territorial cohesion;
agriculture and fisheries, excluding the conservation of marine biological resources;
consumer protection; transport; trans-European networks; energy; area of freedom,
security and justice; common safety concerns in public health matters. TFEU, supra
note 5, art. 4(2)).
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complements the Member States' actions.8 0 This applies, for example,
8
to industry, culture, or tourism-related agreements. '
b.

Exclusive or Shared Competence on Foreign Investment?

In the Commission's view, "the Union has exclusive competence
to conclude agreements covering all matters relating to foreign
investment, that is both foreign direct investment and portfolio
investment."8 2 However, Article 207 of the TFEU refers only to
foreign direct investment, while the question of whether portfolio
investments (which are covered by the protected investment
definition of most IIAs) 8 3 also fall under exclusive EU competence is
contentious. Thus, the scope of EU competence with regard to the

TFEU, supranote 5, art. 6. Article 6 states that in these areas, the EU can
80.
only intervene to support, coordinate or complement the action of Member States.
Consequently, it has no legislative power in these fields and may not interfere in the
exercise of these competences reserved for Member States. Id.
Other areas falling under the supportive competence of the EU include
81.
protection and improvement of human health; education, vocational training, youth
and sport; civil protection; administrative cooperation. Id. art. 6.
Proposed Regulation, supra note 9, at 3. The Commission bases it position
82.
on TFEU Article 63 on the free movement of capital, in combination with TFEU Article
3(2). See id. ("In the Commission's view, the Union must have exclusive competence
also over matters of portfolio investment since the rules being envisaged, which would
apply indistinctly to portfolio investment, may affect the common rules on capital
movement set down in Article 63 of the Treaty.'). Of course, even if this is indeed found
to be the case, the EU may still allow Member States to become party to the
agreements, although it is under no obligation to do so. See, e.g., Allan Rosas, Mixed
Union - Mixed Agreements, in INTERNATIONAL LAW ASPECTS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

125, 130-31 (Martti Koskenniemi ed., 1998).
83.

See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, BALANCE OF PAYMENTS AND

INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT POSITION MANUAL 1 6.54, at 110 (6th ed. 2009), available
at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/bop/2007/pdflbpm6.pdf ("Portfolio investment is
defined as crossborder transactions and positions involving debt or equity securities,
other than those included in direct investment or reserve assets."). Modern IIAs
generally cover not only FDI, but also portfolio investments. For example, the U.S.
Model BIT defines investment as:
[E]very asset that an investor owns or controls, directly or indirectly, that has
the characteristics of an investment, including such characteristics as the
commitment of capital or other resources, the expectation of gain or profit, or
the assumption of risk. Forms that an investment may take include: (a) an
enterprise; (b) shares, stock, and other forms of equity participation in an
enterprise; (c) bonds, debentures, other debt instruments, and loans; (d)
futures, options, and other derivatives; (e) turnkey, construction, management,
production, concession, revenue-sharing, and other similar contracts; (f)
intellectual property rights; (g) licenses, authorizations, permits, and similar
rights conferred pursuant to domestic law; and (h) other tangible or intangible,
movable or immovable property, and related property rights, such as leases,
mortgages, liens, and pledges.
U.S. Model BIT, supra note 19, art. 1. See also, e.g., Reinisch, supranote 46, at 21.
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HAs' subject matter remains unsettled. 84 The Regulation itself also
suggests that such competence may be limited to foreign direct
investment.85 Furthermore, even if portfolio agreements are
eventually found to be within exclusive EU competence, the treaties
to be concluded by the EU are likely to be agreements covering a
broad range of topics, with the consequence that they will almost
inevitably cover areas that do not fall under such exclusive
competence such as transport, energy, or safety concerns in public
health matters. 86 As a result, extra-EU investment agreements are
likely to be mixed agreements to which both the EU and its Member
States will become parties. 87 This is also supported by the EU's

84.
See, e.g., Henquet, supra note 8, at 381-82 (noting that Article 207 of
TFEU, when read literally, only covers direct investments and does not include indirect
investments, and consequently, only direct investments are part of the exclusive
competence of the EU and that indirect investments remain part of the competence of
the EU member states); Reinisch, supra note 46, at 2-5, 20-25; Friedl Weiss & Silke
Steiner, The Investment Regime Under Article 207 of the TFEU - A Legal Conundrum:
The Scope of "Foreign Direct Investment" and the Future of Intra-EU BITs, in
INVESTMENT LAW WITHIN INTERNATIONAL LAW: INTEGRATIONIST PERSPECTIVES 355,

355-67 (detailing the history of the treatment of FDI, as well as the various
interpretations of the term "FDI" (Foreign Direct Investment)).
85.
Regulation, supra note 10, art.1(1).
86.
For a list of FTAs concluded and under negotiations, see Free Trade
Agreements,
EUROPEAN
COMMISSION,
http://ec.europa.eulenterprise/policies/
internationallfacilitating-trade/free-tradeindex en.htm [http://perma.cc/HRW4-CNTV]
(archived Sept. 15, 2014). The negotiations with Canada, India, and Singapore are all
for the purpose of FTAs with investment sections, but there are plans that the EU "will
also develop self standing investment agreements with selected partners." Investment,
EUROPEAN COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eultrade/policy/accessing-markets/investment
[http://perma.cc/3WMB-X89V] (archived Sept. 15, 2014). For example, the planned
agreement with China is to be "the EU's first ever stand-alone investment agreement
since foreign direct investment became the exclusive competence of the EU under the
Lisbon Treaty." Memorandum, European Commission, EU investment negotiations
with China and ASEAN (Oct. 18, 2013), http://trade.ec.europa.euldoclib/press/
index.cfm?id=975 [http://perma.cc/CB8H-8SKK] (archived Sept. 15, 2014).
87.
Marc Bungenberg, The Division of Competences Between the EU and Its
Member States in the Area of Investment Politics, in EUROPEAN YEARBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 2011: INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND EU LAW

29, at 40-42 (Marc Bungenberg, Jorn Griebel & Steffen Hindelang eds., 2011) (pointing
out specifically that "EU investment agreements comparable with US investment
agreements in their scope of application and quality can only be concluded as 'mixed
agreements'."); see Kleinheisterkamp, supra note 73, at 7 (noting that the agreements
are likely to be mixed); Ralph Alexander Lorz, Trying to Change the Rules for
Responding to Arbitration Unilaterally: The Proposed New Framework for InvestorState Dispute Settlement for the EU, 87 COLUMBIA FDI PERSPECTIVES, Jan. 22, 2013,
http://www.vcc.columbia.edulfiles/vale/print/No-87-_Lorz_-_FINAL.pdf. For more on
which cases require mixity of agreements, for example, Rosas, supra note 84, at 13133. Even when the scope of competences covered under the agreement does not strictly
require it, EU Member States can still become parties to such agreements (with the
permission of the EU): these are so-called "false mixed agreements." See Rosas, supra
note 84, at 131.
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current practice, such as in the case of the EU-Korea FTA concluded
in 2010, which was signed by both the EU and its Member States.8 8
c.

Preliminary Conclusion on Exclusive versus Mixed IIAs

The Regulation does not rule out the possibility that the EU IIAs
will be mixed agreements, in spite of the strong position of the
Commission that all foreign investment matters now fall under
exclusive EU competence. In view of several Member States'
opposition to the Commission's expansive interpretation of its newly
acquired competences, 89 the most likely-and politically most
feasible-scenario is that the EU-third state IIAs will be mixed
agreements, in which case there would be prima facie no impediment
to the foreign investor to initiate arbitral procedures against the EU
as well as against its Member States. The Regulation, however,
explicitly seeks to delimit investors' options in choosing its
respondent(s) when launching arbitral procedures under the EUthird state IIAs. This proposal is discussed in the following section,
under the assumption that the EU-third state IIAs will be concluded
as mixed agreements.
2.

The Commission's Proposal

The Regulation aims to eliminate the possibility of bringing a
claim simultaneously against both the EU and a Member State.9 0
Instead, the Regulation adopts an "either/or" determination of
respondent status, whereby the Commission reserves the right to act
as sole respondent in three categories of cases.
The distinguishing factor determining the first category is the
involvement of the EU in the treatment allegedly violating the IIA.
Where the case exclusively concerns "treatment afforded by the
institutions,

. .

. offices or agencies of the Union," the EU will act as

the sole respondent. 9 ' Where the dispute concerns treatment

Free Trade Agreement between the European Union and its Member
88.
States, of the one part, and the Republic of Korea, of the other part, Sept. 16, 2010,
2011 O.J. (L 127) 6. The FTA has been provisionally in force since July 1, 2011. See
Agreement Details, COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, http://www.consilium.europa
.eu/policies/agreements/search-the-agreements-database?command=details&id=&1ang
=en&aid=2010036&doclang=EN
[http://perma.ccl7PL9-FSQP] (archived Sept. 15,
2014).
See the records of various extensive debates in the European Parliament,
89.
available in the Register of Documents (http://www.europarl.europa.eulRegistreWeb/
search/simpleSearchHome.htm, last visited Jan. 3, 2014).
See Proposed Regulation, supra note 9, at 7. See also supra note 77 on the
90.
incorporation of this concept into the CETA.
Id. art. 4(1).
91.

1226

VANDERBILT/OURNAL

OF TRANSNATIONAL

LAW

[VOL. 471203

accorded at least partially by the Member State and partially by the
EU, the Member State may act as respondent, but even then, the
Commission enjoys broad discretion and primacy in deciding whether
it nevertheless wishes to act as the respondent. Where the treatment
was afforded entirely by the Member State, but required by EU law
(resulting in financial liability for the EU), 92 the Commission also has
priority in deciding whether it wishes to act as respondent.93 Both of
these scenarios are based on the-quite understandable-rationale of
EU involvement, either through the EU partially carrying out or
requiring certain conduct. However, it seems disproportionate to
grant the Commission priority to entirely replace the Member State
as respondent, however small the EU's role or financial liability may
be.94
The second category contains cases in which the treatment was
afforded entirely by the Member State with no involvement
whatsoever by the EU (possibly even in breach of EU law), but where
the Commission still has primacy in deciding whether to act as
respondent. According to Article 9(3) of the Regulation:
The Commission may decide by means of implementing acts, based on a
full and balanced factual analysis and legal reasoning provided to the
Member States . . . that the Union is to act as the respondent where
similar treatment is being challenged in a related claim against the
Union in the WTO, where a panel has been established and the claim
concerns the same specific legal issue, and where it is necessary to
ensure a consistent argumentation in the WTO case.

This provision is much more carefully circumscribed than its earlier
versions in the legislative process, which simply made general
reference to the likelihood of similar investment claims at the time of
the case or even in the future-thereby giving the Commission
unduly broad discretion.9 5 In contrast, the Regulation refers to trade
disputes with an already established panel at the WTO. If something
is simultaneously a trade issue and an investment issue, it is likely to
affect the EU as a whole, rather than just the particular Member
State. Given the Commission's undisputed role as the representative
of the EU in trade disputes at the WTO, there is indeed a strong
argument to be made for consistency.
The third category of cases in which the Commission will act as
respondent are cases in which the Member State declines to act as

92.
See id. art. 8(2). For more on compensation, see infra Section III.C.
93.
See id. art. 8(2)(q).
94.
See id. arts. 9(2)(a)-(b) (stating that the EU can decide to act as the
respondent when "the Union would bear all or at least part of the potential financial
responsibility" or "the dispute also concerns treatment afforded by the institutions,
bodies or agencies of the Union" (emphasis added)); see also EP Study, supra note 46,
at 24.
95.
See Proposed Regulation, supra note 9, arts. 8(2)(c)-(d).
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respondent. 96 On the one hand, this residuary power of the
Commission is, in all likelihood, based on the debatable grounds of
exclusive EU competence for all investment matters9 7 and is
therefore questionable-but for the investor and for the sake of
procedural efficiency, it offers at least a clear and predictable picture.
On the other hand, this arrangement also enables the Member State
to deliberately decline respondent status, thereby hoping to avoid
responsibility." However, the Member State would do so at its own
peril, as it would then have only limited influence on the defense
mounted by the Commission, and if financial liability is established,
it would have to reimburse the EU in accordance with the terms of
the Regulation. 9
3.

Problematic Issues

Two problems with regard to respondent status may arise under
the Regulation: (1) disagreement between the Commission and the
Member State involved on the appropriate defense strategy and (2)
violation of the fair trial rights of the EU and/or its Member State.
Whereas the first issue may effectively undermine a consistent line of
defense, the second raises direct concerns about the proper
administration of justice.
a.

Disagreement on the Defense Strategy

Situations could arise in which the conduct of a Member State
would have to be defended by the EU-more precisely, the
Commission. In these situations, the terms of the Regulation require
that the Commission "take all necessary measures to defend and
protect the interests of the Member State concerned[,]" stipulating
that "the Commission and the Member State concerned shall prepare
the defence in close co-operation with each other[.]" 0 0 Indeed, the
Commission is under an obligation to share documents with the
Member State, and consult with the latter when the Member State so
requests. Furthermore, the Member State's representatives form part
of the delegation by default. 01 However, it remains an open question
whether, and to what extent, the Member State's wishes regarding
the defense strategy will effectively be taken into account. At the very

96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

See Regulation, supra note 10, art. 9(1)(b).
See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
See EP Study, supra note 46, at 25.
See id.; see also infra Section III.C.
Regulation, supra note 10, art. 11(1)(a), (d).
Id. art. 11(1)(c), (e).
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least, the version adopted by the European Parliament already shows
greater sensitivity regarding the Member State's interests than the
original draft proposed by the Commission. A new article has been
added on cooperation and consultations between the Commission and
the Member State;102 and amendments specifically state that "[i]n
acting pursuant to this Article [i.e. Article 9], the Commission shall
ensure that the Union's defence protects the financial interests of the
Member State concerned" 0 3 and that:
When the Union acts as the respondent in accordance with paragraphs
2 and 5, the Commission shall consult the Member State concerned on
any pleading or observation prior to the finalisation and submission
thereof. Representatives of the Member State concerned shall, at the
Member State's request and at its expense, form part of the Union's
delegation to any hearing and the Commission shall take due account of
the Member State's interest.1 0 4

On the question of cooperation, one may look to the experience of
the EU and its Member States with WTO dispute settlement for an
indication of what to expect. Although sources generally speak of a
"[p]ositive experience of the practice in WTO dispute settlement,"lo5
there appears to be little direct involvement of Member States, who
instead exercise their influence indirectly through EU institutions. 10 6
Cooperation in concrete cases seems to function more on an ad hoc
basis, than in a pre-established framework. 0 7 Arguably, this

102.
Id. art. 6.
103.
Id. art. 9(4).
104.
Id. art. 9(6).
105.
EP Study, supra note 46, at 21-22; see also Michael Hahn & Livia Danielli,
You'll Never Walk Alone: The European Union and Its Member States in the WTO, in
EUROPEAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL

ECONOMIC LAW: COMMON COMMERCIAL

POLICY AFTER LISBON 49, 58 (Marc Bungenberg & Christoph Herrmann eds., 2013)
(stating "the practice works, by and large, well"); Pieter Jan Kuijper, International
Responsibility for EU Mixed Agreements, in MIXED AGREEMENTS REVISITED: THE EU
AND ITS MEMBER STATES IN THE WORLD 208, at 224 (Christophe Hillion & Panos

Koutrakos eds., 2010) (speaking of "intense cooperation" in the context of "the
'Airbus/Boeing' litigation"); Allan Rosas, InternationalDispute Settlement: EUPractices
and Procedures, 46 GERMAN Y.B. INT'L L. 284, 299 (2003) ("[T]he handling of WTO
disputes . . . has proceeded on a pragmatic basis, with a central role for the
Commission, and can by and large be counted among the EU success stories.")
(footnotes omitted).
106.
See ASJA SERDAREVIC, THE EUROPEAN UNION AS A COLLECTIVE ACTOR IN
THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 198-99 (2013); Thomas Cottier, Dispute Settlement

in the World Trade Organization:Characteristicsand Structural Implications for the
European Union, 35 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 325, 353 (1998) (remarking on the EU's
participation in WTO dispute settlement both in areas of shared and exclusive EU
competence); see also Hahn & Danielli, supra note 107, at 51(discussing more generally
on "the Union's policy within the WTO").
107.
Cottier, supra note 108, at 355-56; see JONI HELISKOSKI, MIXED
AGREEMENTS AS A TECHNIQUE FOR ORGANIZING THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OF THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND ITS MEMBER STATES 111 (Martti Koskenniemi ed. 2001)

(suggesting that proceeding on an ad hoc basis might actually ease cooperation). For a
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"positive experience" is influenced by the fact that the EU's exclusive
competence-at least for trade in goods-has been well-established
for decades, unlike its competences concerning investment matters.
Member States may well feel more protective with regard to their
investment policies that they have carefully developed since the
conclusion of the first BITs in the 1960s-and hence less willing to
grant the Commission a free rein in setting out a defense strategy in
investment arbitration procedures. Furthermore, the "worst" outcome
in a WTO case is that a certain measure, which is found in breach of
the WTO covered agreements, would have to be withdrawn or
amended. Investment arbitration, on the other hand, additionally
carries the substantial risk that a significant amount of compensation
is awarded to a successful claimant which would then have to be paid
(at least partially) by the Member State found in breach-again a
sound reason for a Member State to reject handing over full control to
the Commission. Thus, the usefulness of examining the EU's
practices before the WTO Dispute Settlement Body in order to predict
future investment arbitration practices is limited because, as one
study notes, "investment arbitration is conducted differently from the
more diplomatic dispute resolution in the WTO context." 108 Moreover,
the claimant party (e.g., the investor) in an arbitral proceeding is not
a party to the treaty that lies at the basis of the dispute (e.g., the IIA),
so the claimant's interests influencing the treaty's interpretation may
well be different from those of the Contracting Parties (e.g., the
States) who designed the IIA. Investment arbitration could also be
seen as a more adversarial "litigatory" process than the more
compromise-oriented WTO Dispute Settlement Body. This is in spite
of the confidentiality usually attached to pending investment cases,
which takes away the pressure of the public eye, and which often
allows for successful settlement negotiations after a claim has already
been brought. These significant differences in character, between
investment and WTO proceedings, imply one should proceed with
caution when making analogies about the EU's conduct as a litigant.
In any event, if the Member State considers that its rights have
been not been well-represented, it could potentially initiate
proceedings against the Commission before the Court of Justice of the
European Union (CJEU). 09

brief discussion of attempts at such a pre-established framework, see Rosas, supra note
107, at 298; Heliskoski, supra note 109, at 117.
EP Study, supra note 46, at 22.
108.
See infra Section IV.
109.
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Violation of Fair Trial Rights

Even more fundamentally, the question arises whether, under
international law, an arbitral tribunal can even render a decision on
the responsibility of the Member State involved if the Commission
acts as the sole respondent. If the Member State concerned is not
party to the proceedings, while the vital issue to be settled concerns a
pronouncement of the tribunal on the responsibility of that state, this
could raise the application of the Monetary Gold principle set out by
the International Court of Justice. The Monetary Gold principle
states that a third state's responsibility cannot be adjudicated
without that state's consent.110 A state, like an individual, has a right
to a fair trial, which includes the right to a fair hearing as well as a
right to being offered an opportunity to defend itself. Arguably, this
right would be denied to EU Member States, which would have to
watch their rights being assessed without being able to represent
themselves and put forward their own defense in the proceedings.
The Monetary Gold principle does not apply if the third state's
responsibility is merely ancillary to the case,"' but in the present
context, the conduct of the Member State would most likely be at the
very center of the claim.
Considering that, in IIAs, consent is given in advance through
the arbitration clause, application of the Monetary Gold principle may
not necessarily be considered a bar to the proceedings, as the tribunal
would, in any event, have jurisdiction over claims lodged under the
same IIA against the Member State as well.11 2 However, it would
seem possible-without a clear incorporation of the Regulation's
terms into the IIA, for example-that the tribunal would refuse to
decide on a certain claim. This may happen unless (1) the Member
State is party to the proceedings, or (2) in a case where it is

110.
"Where, as in the present case, the vital issue to be settled concerns the
international responsibility of a third State, the Court cannot, without the consent of
that third State, give a decision on that issue binding upon any State, either the third
State, or any of the parties before it." Monetary Gold Removed from Rome in 1943 (It.
v. Fr., U.K., N. Ir. and U.S.), 1954 I.C.J. 19, 33 (June 15). For an example of
considering the Monetary Gold principle in the investment context, see Third Interim
Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Chevron Corp. v. Republic of Ecuador, No.
2009-23 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2012), TT 4.60-4.71, available at http://www.italaw.com/sites/
default/files/case-documents/itaOl75.pdf [http://perma.cc/9UMC-AHYR] (archived Sept.
14, 2014).
111.
See infra note 118 and accompanying text.
112.
Cf. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Yugoslavia), 1996 I.C.J. 595 (July 11), at 613-14,
26, (alteration in original) (referring to "the principle according to which it should not
penalize a defect in a procedural act which the applicant could easily remedy [by
initiating a new application]."). See, e.g., TSA Spectrum de Argentina S.A. v. Argentine
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/5, Award, T 112 (Dec. 19, 2008) (refusing to reject
the case on the ground of failure to observe the formalities in Article 10(3) of the BIT).
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represented by the Commission, the Member State has explicitly
waived its right thereto and confirmed full consent to its
responsibility under the treaty being assessed.
Looking at the Monetary Gold principle from the EU's
perspective, the question is whether the responsibility of the EU could
even be determined if the Member State is not a party to the dispute.
As stated, application of the Monetary Gold principle depends on
whether the Member State's "legal interests .

.

. would form the very

113
Unless determining the
subject-matter of the decision."
responsibility of the Member State is "a prerequisite for the
114
the EU (which is not a very
determination of the responsibility of'
likely scenario), Monetary Gold does not preclude adjudication of the
EU's responsibility. The reverse situation may also arise if, for
instance, an investor challenges a Member State's measure that
implements an EU directive and the investor does not initiate
proceedings against the EU. The question then is whether
determining the EU's responsibility is "a prerequisite for the
determination of the responsibility of' the Member State, which may
well be the case. 115 The advance consent to arbitration clause of IIAs
solves many of these problems, but the tribunal could still find itself
caught between the Commission's determination of the appropriate
respondent, on the one hand, and the Monetary Gold principle, on the
other hand. In the end, this may be more of a theoretical problem
than a practical one: the above examples show that it will probably
only arise if the Commission declines the opportunity to act as
respondent, which is not very likely. In the scenario outlined above,
for example, when a Member State allegedly wrongly implements an
EU directive, the Commission is almost certain to step in based on
Article 9(2)(a) of the Regulation.

4.

Preliminary Conclusion on Respondent Status

The most-and perhaps too-simple answer would be that, by
transferring competence over foreign investment to the EU level,
Member States have implicitly also agreed in advance to the
representation of their interests by the Commission, much like subfederal entities (say, the states within the United States) are
represented by the federal level. Alternatively, it could be argued that
respondent status should be seen entirely as a matter of

See Monetary Gold, supra note 112, at 32; see also Certain Phosphate
113.
Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Austl.), 1992 I.C.J. 240, J1 49-55 (June 26); East Timor
23-35 (June 30).
(Port. v. Austl.), 1995 I.C.J. 90,
Nauru, supra note 115, at 261.
114.
Id.
115.
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representation,and thus detached from responsibility. In other words,
the issue at hand would still be the responsibility of the Member
State, except the Member State would not represent itself but let
itself be represented by a delegation from the Commission. 116
Although such a view may be tenable throughout the proceedings, it
can cause problems if, and when, it comes to remedies-particularly
remedies other than compensation. Arbitration rules stipulate that
awards are final and binding on the parties to the dispute.1 17
Therefore, the payment of compensation or the performance of any
other remedial measure would have to be carried out by the European
Union; the Member State would not be bound by the award vis-A-vis
the investor. Since investment tribunals rarely, if ever, order
anything other than compensation," 8 this problem could simply be
avoided through the EU honoring the award and reclaiming the
amount internally from the Member State, in accordance with the
rules laid down in the Regulation." 9 But in the, admittedly unlikely,
event that the award requires specific measures to be taken by the
Member State (e.g., change of legislation), the EU could not
practically enforce these over the objections of the Member State
concerned.120

116.
Compare HELISKOSKI, supra note 109, at 194-97, in the context of joint
proceedings, distinguishing joint proceedings from joint responsibility: "[riather than
an indication prejudging the question of responsibility, the mode of joint proceedings
should properly be conceived as a procedural strategy." His argument is different from
the one put forward here, as in such a case "[t]he materially competent
respondent ... would however always be involved." Id. at 197.
117.
See 2010 UNCITRAL Rules, supra note 28, art. 34(2); SCC Rules of
Arbitration art. 40, available at http://www.sceinstitute.com/filearchive/3/35894/

K4_Skiljedomsregler%20eng%20ARB%20TRYCK_1_100927.pdf [http://perma.cc/G7EUCFR2] (archived Sept. 14, 2014); ICC Rules of Arbitration art. 34(6), available at
http://www.iccwbo.org/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=2147489109
(last visited
Sept. 14, 2014) [http://perma.cc/TX22-5HJH] (archived Sept. 14, 2014).
118.
See Kleinheisterkamp, supra note 73, at 18; see also Anne van Aaken,
Primary and Secondary Remedies in InternationalInvestment Law and National State

Liability: A Functional and Comparative View, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW
AND COMPARATIVE PUBLIC LAW 721, 734-35 (Stephan W. Schill ed., 2010).

119.
For more on compensation and financial liability, see infra Section III.C.
120. TFEU, supra note 5, art. 207(6) ("The exercise of the competences conferred
by this Article in the field of the common commercial policy .. . shall not lead to
harmonisation of legislative or regulatory provisions of the Member States in so far as
the Treaties exclude such harmonization."); see EP Study, supra note 46, at 17.

According to the technical summary of the Canada-EU FTA, an investment tribunal
"cannot order the repeal of the host state's measure," although it "may order an award,

separately or in combination, for damages or restitution of property, as well as costs."
Technical Summary, supra note 66, at 15. This is confirmed in the Consolidated CETA

Text, supra note 68, art. X.36. Then again, the Regulation defines "settlement" as "any
agreement between the Union or a Member State, or both, of the one part, and a
claimant, of the other, whereby the claimant agrees not to pursue its claims in
exchange for the payment of a sum of money or action other than the payment of
money." Regulation, supra note 10, art. 2(h) (emphasis added).
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Finally, even if the Regulation's arrangements are incorporated
into the IIA, the investor could still have the possibility to bring two
separate cases-one against the EU, one against the Member Stateand ask for a joinder of these cases. It would then be up to the
Commission and the Member State to argue that this is not in
conformity with-at least the spirit of-the arbitration clause. A
similar problem would arise if an investor would bring a case against
the EU, lose that case, and then try to bring the same complaint
against the Member State (or vice versa). It seems, however, that the
EU might have anticipated at least some of these issues. A summary
of the largely finalized Canada-EU FTA's terms provides that "[t]o
pursue [a] claim, an investor must file a waiver abandoning any other
parallel claim it may have seeking damages related to the same
measure(s)" and that "future claims are also prohibited when the ...
claim is dismissed on its merits." 121 Since in some cases it may be
highly unclear who has extended a certain treatment, investors may
be relieved to know that "if the .

.

. claim is dismissed in its early

stages, such as on procedural or jurisdictional grounds, then an
22
investor may pursue its claim elsewhere."1
B. Determining Who is Responsible: Attribution of Conduct
The second problem created by the Regulation relates to the
determination of who is responsible. Under the international rules on
responsibility of states and international organizations, an
internationally wrongful act consists of a certain conduct (act or
omission) which forms a breach of international law (here, the IIA)
and which can be attributed to an actor who was under such
obligation.' 2 3 The latter element (attribution) may give rise to legal
difficulties in the present context. In the case of mixed agreements,
both the EU and its Member States would be under the obligation to
comply with the IIA, but this does not imply that the conduct of either
could automatically be extended to the other. In its explanatory

Technical Summary, supra note 68, at 14; confirmed, albeit not literally, in
121.
the Consolidated CETA Text, supra note 68, art. X.21(1)(f)(g) and (5).
Technical Summary, supra note 68, at 14; confirmed in the Consolidated
122.
CETA Text, supra note 68, art. X.21(5).
See ARSIWA, supra note 71, art. 2; Report of the laternational Law
123.
Commission, U.N. General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/66/10, GAOR 66th Sess., Supp. No.
10, at 53, (2011) [hereinafter ARIO] ("The characterization of an act of an international
organization as internationally wrongful is governed by international law."). These
Articles were adopted by the UN General Assembly in 2011 (Res. 66/100 of 9 December
2011) and although they have not been incorporated in any treaty, they are
nevertheless largely (albeit not entirely) considered to be a codification of international
customary rules on this topic. JAMES CRAWFORD, BROWNLIE'S PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 182 (8th ed. 2013).
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memorandum to the Proposed Regulation, the Commission put
forward that attribution should not be determined by the author of
the act but on the basis of the competence for the subject matter. 124
In simple terms, like parents can be held legally responsible for the
acts of their children, the EU would be responsible for the conduct of
its Member States, if such conduct would concern a subject matter
which falls under EU competence. The problem with determining
attribution based on competence is that it departs from the usual
international legal approach and, more importantly, that it differs
from the manner in which respondent status as well as the identity of
the bearer of the duty to compensate is determined. The section below
first deals with the legal value of the Commission's explanatory
memorandum, followed by an examination of the general
international rules on attribution as applicable in the present
context.
1.

Legal Value of the Explanatory Memorandum

Unlike the arrangements on respondent status, the Regulation
itself does not contain any provisions on how responsibility should be
determined, nor did the Proposed Regulation; the Commission's views
in this respect are only outlined in the so-called "explanatory
memorandum" accompanying the Proposed Regulation. Therefore,
even if the IIA's arbitration clause incorporates the Regulation, it will
still not cover the issue of determination of responsibility-unless the
contents of the explanatory memorandum of the Proposed Regulation
were also to be incorporated in to the IIA, for example as an annex.
According to the explanatory memorandum of the Proposed
Regulation, responsibility should be based on competence-and not
the identity of the entity that actually extended the allegedly
wrongful treatment: 125
Should it be the case that both the European Union and the Member
States are parties to an agreement and it needs to be decided who is
responsible as a matter of international law for any particular action,
the Commission takes the view that this has to be decided not by the
author of the act, but on the basis of the competence for the subject
matter of the international rules in question, as set down in the
Treaty.126

This is contrary to the organizing principle in the Proposed (as
well as the ultimately adopted) Regulation to determine both

124.
Infra note 131 and accompanying text.
125.
Compare the use of the term "treatment" in Proposed Regulation, supra
note 9, at 4, with "conduct" as seen in ARIO, supra note 125. Although there are some
differences between the two terms, they essentially rest on the same concept.
126.
Proposed Regulation, supra note 9, at 4.
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(though with some
status and compensation
respondent
relies on Opinion
Commission
the
adjustments). To support its view,
Agreement on
the
of
context
the
in
stated
1/91 of the CJEU, which
that:
(EEA)
the European Economic Area
The expression 'Contracting Parties' is defined in Article 2(c) of the
[EEA] agreement. As far as the Community and its Member States are
concerned, it covers the Community and the Member States, or the
Community, or the Member States, depending on the case. Which of the
three possibilities is to be chosen is to be deduced in each case from the
relevant provisions of the agreement and from the respective
competences of the Community and the Member States as they follow
from the EEC Treaty and the ECSC Treaty.

127

However, on plain reading, it appears that the CJEU opinion-unlike
with
status
respondent
proposal-links
Commission
the
the
in
either
Parties"
"Contracting
discusses
and
responsibility,
"responsibility"
and
"respondent"
the
both
in
or
''respondent" sense
sense.
Setting aside the persuasiveness or otherwise of the
Commission's arguments, it remains an open question to what extent
the contents of the explanatory memorandum would be taken into
account by an arbitral tribunal. While, strictly speaking, it cannot
qualify as travaux prdparatoires,since it was not created during the

preparation of an IIA, it would most likely be taken into account-if
128
In accordance
at all-as a supplementary means of interpretation.
with Article 32 of the 1986 VCLT,
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation ... in
order to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of article
31, or to determine the meaning when the interpretation according to
article 31:
(a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or
129
(b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.

Opinion 1/91, Community v. Countries of the European Free Trade
127.
Association, 1991 E.C.R. I-06099, 1 33 (emphasis added) (delivering the Opinion
pursuant to the second subparagraph of Article 228(1) of the Treaty-Draft agreement
between the Community, on the one hand, and the countries of the European Free
Trade Association, on the other, relating to the creation of the European Economic
Area).
See Yves le Bouthillier, Article 32 (1986), in 1 THE VIENNA CONVENTIONS
128.
OF TREATIES: A COMMENTARY 864, at 865, 1 4 (Olivier Corten & Pierre
LAW
THE
ON
Klein eds., 2011).
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and
129.
International Organizations or Between International Organizations, Mar. 20, 1986, 25
I.L.M. 543. Although the Convention is not in force, this provision arguably reflects
customary international law, since, as noted by the ILC commentary to the draft
convention, "articles 31, 32 and 33 ... reproduce unchanged articles 31, 32 and 33 of
the [1969] Vienna Convention." See Report of the InternationalLaw Commission to the
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But if there is no provision at all on determination of responsibility, it
seems quite a stretch of the imagination to conclude that any one of
the three scenarios outlined above--confirmation, ambiguous
meaning, or manifestly absurd result-could be reached by an
arbitral tribunal. It is more likely that in the absence of lex specialis
laid down in the agreement, the tribunal would simply look to the
general rules on the responsibility of international organizations.
2.

Applying General Rules to a Specific Context

Interestingly enough, there is some doubt as to what exactly the
general rules on the responsibility of international organizations
entail. Different international adjudicatory institutions and the
International Law Commission (ILC) have displayed different
approaches to determining the responsibility of the EU and/or its
Member States. As the case will ultimately turn on which approach
an arbitral tribunal finds more convincing: the conduct-based, or the
competence-based determination of responsibility. A brief overview of
each is given below.
a.

The Conduct-based Approach

The responsibility of the EU and/or its Member States can arise
with conduct that may be categorized as follows: (1) conduct of EU
organs themselves, (2) conduct of Member States acting pursuant to
an EU measure, and (3) conduct of Member States acting on their
own accord.130 The first scenario is quite clear (the EU is responsible
for the conduct of its own organs), and will therefore not be further
discussed,131 while the third scenario is only of concern when the
Member State's conduct has an impact in an area falling under EU
competence. The analysis below will thus focus on the second
scenario.
Following in the footsteps of the ILC's Articles on State
Responsibility, the ILC's Draft Articles on the Responsibility of
International Organizations define an internationally wrongful act as
"conduct consisting of an action or omission [which] (a) is attributable
to that organization under international law and (b) constitutes a
breach of an international obligation of that organization."13 2
GeneralAssembly, 37 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 10), UN Doc. A/37/10, reprinted in [1982]
2(2) Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 17, at 41, UN Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1982/Add.1 (Part 2)
(providing commentary on the articles of the Vienna Convention); see also le
Bouthillier, supranote 130, at 864-65.
130.
For a somewhat similar categorization, see Eva Steinberger, The WTO
Treaty as a Mixed Agreement: Problems with the EC's and the EC Member States'
Membership of the WTO, 17 EUR. J. INT'L L. 837, 850 (2006).
131.
See Proposed Regulation, supra note 9, art. 4.
132.
ARIO, supra note 125, art. 4.
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The following conduct is attributable to the international
organization in question: acts or omissions of its organs or agents
(Article 6), that of organs or agents of other states/organizations
placed at its disposal (Article 7), and conduct acknowledged and
adopted by it (Article 9).133 While this may seem fairly
straightforward at first sight, it is complicated by the fact that
different bodies-most notably the ECtHR and various WTO panelshave taken different views as to whether certain types of conduct are
attributable to the EU or to one of its Member States when a certain
EU measure is carried out or implemented by the Member States.
i.

Human Rights Cases

In general, the ECtHR has shown a greater tendency to attribute
such conduct to the Member State. In Cantoni, it held that the fact
that a piece of French legislation "is based almost word for word on
Community Directive 65/65 . . . does not remove it from the ambit of .

. . the Convention." 134 Similarly, in the Matthews case, the Court
decided that "[t]he Convention does not exclude the transfer of
competences to international organizations provided that Convention
rights continue to be 'secured'. Member States' responsibility
therefore continues even after such a transfer."a 5 Even where there
was no margin of appreciation or discretion for the Member State-as
in Bosphorus, 3 6 which concerned an Irish measure taken pursuant to
an EU sanctions regulation-the Court still held that "a Contracting
Party is responsible under Article 1 of the Convention for all acts and
omissions of its organs regardless of whether the act or omission in
question was a consequence of domestic law or of the necessity to
comply with international legal obligations."137
In sum, the ECtHR has been more inclined to attribute
implementing conduct to the Member States. It is a commonly held
Id. at 12 (addressing attribution under certain circumstances which are not
133.
relevant for this article's analysis).
134.
Cantoni v. France, 1996-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 1614, 1628, 1 32; see also ECtHR,
Factsheet: Case-law concerning the EU [hereinafter Factsheet] http://www.echr.coe.int/
Documents/FSEuropeanUnion_ENG.pdf (last visited Sept. 14, 2014) [http://perma.cc/
5W3N-UPKY] (archived Sept. 14, 2014) (referring to the decision in Cantoni v. France).
Matthews v. The United Kingdom, 1999-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 251, 265, 1 32;
135.
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. I,
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (referring to 'securing': "The High Contracting Parties
shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined
in . . . this Convention.")

Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Sirketi v. Ireland, 2005136.
153. See also ECtHR, Factsheet, supra note 136, at 3 (noting
VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 107,
that "[flor the first time [the Court] agreed to examine on the merits a complaint
concerning measures taken to give effect to Community law where the State had no
margin of appreciation").
Bosphorus, supra note 138, at 157, 153.
137.
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view that this approach is mainly due to the ECtHR's lack of
jurisdiction so far over the EU13 8 and "driven by the mission of the
Court to provide effective human rights protection." 3 9 In other
words, if the ECtHR had not held the Member States responsible, the
violation of the victims' rights would have gone unpunished as the
EU was not a party to the European Convention on Human Rights,
hence not bound by its terms and could not be sued before the Court.
However, it is interesting to note that according to the recently
finalized EU accession agreement to the European Convention on
Human Rights, "an act, measure or omission of organs of a Member
State of the European Union or of persons acting on its behalf shall
be attributed to that State, even if such act, measure, or omission
occurs when the State implements the law of the European Union."140
At the same time, this does not exclude the participation of the EU in
a case alongside the Member State, through the so-called corespondent mechanism.' 4 ' In other words, although the EU will no
longer fall outside the ECtHR's jurisdiction, the same approach is
maintained as before-the only difference being that the EU can be
"added" to the proceedings, in addition to the Member State. A
possible explanation for this approach could be that EU rules most
often do not directly provide treatment for individuals and hence
cannot directly breach their rights. The risk of breaching human
rights law is greater in the case of Member States implementing EU
rules. Furthermore, the goal of stipulating that the EU should be
added as a respondent in addition to the Member State might serve to
avoid a situation in which valuable time is lost by suing the wrong
respondent; drafters might have desired to prevent a situation in
138.
See, e.g., Frank Hoffmeister, Litigating against the European Union and Its
Member States-Who Responds under the ILC's Draft Articles on International
Responsibility of International Organizations?, 21 EUR. J. INT'L L. 723, 735, 738-39
(2010) ("Whereas attribution of Member States' conduct to the Union would lead to the
undesired result that the case would have to be declared inadmissible, attribution to
the Member State affirms the jurisdiction of the Court."); Kuijper, supra note 107, at
211.
139.
Hoffmeister, supranote 140, at 735.
140.
Draft Revised Agreement on the Accession of the European Union to the
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Fifth
Negotiation Meeting between the CDDH Ad Hoc Negotiation Group and the European
Commission on the Accession of the European Union to the European Convention on
Human Rights, Final Report to the CDDH, June 10, 2013, Appendix I, art. 1(4),
available at
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/hrpolicy/Accession/Meeting
reports/47_1(2013)008rev2-EN.pdf (last visited Sept. 14, 2014) [http://perma.cc/S23A43SY] (archived Sept. 14, 2014).
141.
Id.; see, e.g., Jean Paul Jacqu6, The Accession of the European Union to the
European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 48 COMMON
MKT. L. REV. 995, 1007, 1012-16 (2011) (discussing the co-respondent based on early
drafts of the accession agreement); Tobias Lock, Walking on a Tightrope: The Draft
ECHR Accession Agreement and the Autonomy of the EU Legal Order, 48 COMMoN
MKT. L. REV. 1025, 1038-45 (2011).
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which individuals seeking redress for human rights violations would
be forced to exhaust multiple local remedies systems.
ii.

Economic Law Cases

Unlike the ECtHR, WTO panels have been receptive to the idea
that Member States can act as organs of the EU. The EU has long
been involved in GATT, and became-together with its Member
States-an original member of the WTO when the latter was
established in 1995.142 The new WTO agreements, covering not only
trade in goods, but also trade in services and intellectual property
rights, 143 extended into areas which-the CJEU determined-did not
fall under exclusive EU competence, but rather shared competence
between the EU and its Member States. 144 Subsequent amendments
to the EU founding treaties ensured that EU exclusive competence
now covers all WTO agreements.' 4 5 The mixed treaty problem in the
context of foreign investment hence does not play, or at least does not
play strongly, in the trade context. In sharp contrast to the ECtHR,
the EU not only participates, but also plays a prominent role in the
WTO dispute settlement system. Although some states-particularly
the United States-have tried to sue Member States and the EU
separately, no single EU Member State has defended itself on its own
since the inception of the WTO. 146 On the contrary, the EU always

See GATT, supra note 11; WTO Agreement, supra note 11, art. XI(1)
142.
(listing the EU (then EC) as an original member in WTO Agreement art. XI(1)).
Annexes 1A, lB and 1C to the WTO Agreement are respectively the
143.
multilateral agreements on trade in goods, services and intellectual property. See WTO
Agreement, supra note 11; GATS, supra note 40; TRIPS, supra note 40; General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1154.
See Opinion 1/94, Competence of the Community to conclude international
144.
agreements concerning services and the protection of intellectual property-Article
228(6) of the EC Treaty, 1994 E.C.R. 1-5389 (holding the Community and its Member
States are jointly competent to conclude GATS and TRIPs); see also Steinberger, supra
note 132, at 844-55; Hahn & Danielli, supra note 107, at 53.
See, e.g., Hahn & Danielli, supra note 107, at 50, 61.
145.
Id. at 59. Even cases where EU Member States have been respondents
146.
alongside the EU are rare. There are only two such cases which led to a Panel (and
Appellate Body) report: the LAN case, and EuropeanCommunities-MeasuresAffecting
Trade in Large Civil Aircraft. See Panel Report, European Communities-Measures
Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, WT/DS316 (June 30, 2010); Panel Report,
European Communities-Customs Classification of Certain Computer Equipment,
WT/DS62/R, WT/DS67/R, WT/DS68/R (Feb. 5, 1998). Then again, the possibility is not
excluded. See Panel Report, European Communities-Tariff Treatment of Certain
Information Technology Products, 1 7.86, WT/DS375/R, WT/DS376/R, WT/DS377/R
(Aug. 16, 2010). Finally, it is worth noting that EU Member States have also not been
complainants in their own right before WTO panels. See Piet Eeckhout, The EU and its
Member States in the WTO-Issues of Responsibility, in REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS
AND THE WTO LEGAL SYSTEM 449, 453 (Lorand Bartels & Federico Ortino eds., 2006).
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acts as respondent in WTO cases, whether on its own or together with
Member States.
EU measures enacted through Member States have been
challenged a number of times before the WTO, raising issues of
attribution and responsibility. A notable instance was the EC Computer Equipment (LAN) case, which the United States initiated
against not only the European Community, but also the UK and
Ireland, regarding tariff treatment of certain computer equipment by
their customs authorities.147 The WTO panel report focused its
examination "on whether customs authorities in the European
Communities, including those located in Ireland and the United
Kingdom, have or have not deviated from the obligations assumed,"
but the conclusions and the recommendations were addressed solely
to the EU.148 In the subsequent EC - Trademarks and Geographical
Indications case, the panel went even a step further, accepting the
EU's submission "that Community laws are generally not executed
through authorities at Community level but rather through recourse
to the authorities of its Member States which, in such a situation, 'act
de facto as organs of the Community, for which the Community would
be responsible under WTO law and international law in general'."149
Similarly, in EC - Selected Customs Matters, the panel concluded that
"the authorities in the Member States . . . act as organs of the

European Communities when they review and correct administrative
action taken pursuant to EC customs law."' 5 0 In the latter two cases,
however, the responsibility of the Member States themselves was
actually not at issue, only whether the conduct of their organs could
be attributed to the EU. This might explain why the panel reverted to
the reasoning of the LAN case in the most recent EC - IT Products
case, brought by the United States, Japan, and Taiwan against not
only the EC, but all its Member States.' 5 ' Accordingly, it did "not
consider it necessary to determine at the outset whether to rule on the
147.
Panel Report, European Communities-Customs Classification of Certain
Computer Equipment, 11 4.9-4.15, 8.15-8.17, WT/DS62/R, WT/DS67/R, WT/DS68/R
(Feb. 5, 1998) (discussing the status of defending parties in the LAN case).
148.
Id.
8.16 (emphasis added); see also Kuijper, supra note 107, at 214 n.32
(asserting that the Appellate Body Report did not touch upon this issue "in an
authoritative manner").
149.
Panel Report, European Communities-Protection of Trademarks and
Geographical Indications for Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs, 1 7.98,
WT/DS174/R (Mar. 15, 2005) (footnote omitted).
150.
Panel Report, European Communities-Selected Customs Matters, 7.553,
WT/DS315/R (June 16, 2006). That said, in this case, the responsibility of Member
States was not at issue, only that of the EU. See id. 7.548.
151.
See generally Panel Report, European Communities and its Member
States-Tariff Treatment of Certain Information Technology Products,
6.10-6.12,
7.80-7.90, 8.2, WT/DS375/R, WT/DS376/R, WT/DS377/R (Aug. 16, 2010) (providing
general comments of the complainant, European Communities and the panel, the
status of the parties and the panel's findings).
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claims directed against EC Member States,"15 2 and came eventually
to the following conclusion:
[I]f one or more EC member States were found to have applied WTO

inconsistent measures, be they enacted by the States themselves or by
the European Communities, it could be appropriate to find that the
member States have acted inconsistently with their WTO obligations.
However, we note that the complainants have framed their claims as
challenging the European Communities measures 'as such' and have
confirmed to the Panel that they are not making claims with respect to
specific applications of those measures by national customs authorities
of any member States. Under the circumstances, the Panel considers
that it is not required to make, and does not make, findings with
respect to member States' application of the European Communities'
153
measures that were challenged 'as such' in this dispute.

Thus, the panel ultimately sidestepped the question of Member
States' responsibility by focusing on the nature of the claim.
All in all, WTO panels have shown a good deal of pragmatism on
the issue of attributing Member States' conduct to the EU. They have
been receptive to the idea of Member State authorities acting as de
facto organs of the EU, but at the same time they also did not exclude
the possibility of joint responsibility, even if they have not applied it
in the cases at hand.
b.

The Competence-based Approach

The tying of responsibility to competence rather than treatment
or conduct arguably results in a much more straightforward
delineation of responsibility. In areas where the EU has exclusive
competence (such as over foreign direct investment), only the EU can
be found responsible-regardless of what the Member State does. In
areas of shared competence (portfolio investments might ultimately
fall into this category), the determination is similarly free of
complications. Where the EU has shared competence with the
Member States, the latter may only "exercise their competence to the
extent that the Union has not exercised its competence."154 Therefore,
by definition, the issuing of a regulation, directive, or decision (which
is what might violate the IIA and thus trigger dispute settlement
mechanisms) is exactly what determines in such cases that something
falls under EU competence. In neither of these scenarios does the
arbitral tribunal need to examine whether the Member State acted on
its own accord or pursuant to an EU measure. The arbitral tribunal

Id. T 7.89.
152.
8.2; see also id. at T 7.106 (noting that the DSU does not distinguish
Id.
153.
between challenging measures "as such" and "as applied").
TFEU, supra note 5, art. 2(2).
154.
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furthermore need not consider how a Member State implemented
that measure, or whether the implementation was even in conformity
with EU law.155
That said, relying solely on competence to determine
responsibility may also lead to awkward results, as illustrated in the
following hypothetical: let us assume that the EU issues a directive,
which does not breach the IIA. One of the Member States implements
it in a way that does violate the IIA, while it could have been
implemented in a non-violating way. For example, its aim could have
been reached through other means. The EU will be found responsible
by virtue of its competence, even though it had no influence
whatsoever on the implementation and itself did not breach the IIA.
At most the EU could be blamed for not having prevented this
through an infringement procedure-but this would be a violation
through omission, which is not the same as having committed the
breach oneself. Also, such an infringement procedure against a
Member State can only be brought post-factum, after the Member
State has already committed a violation. In other words, while there
is a breach of the IIA, this would not be attributable to the EU under
a conduct-based approach. But since in this scenario, competence
replaces conduct as the test for attribution, the violation will be
"attributable" to the EU. Steinberger refers to this as a question of
simple "risk allocation": the EU must bear the necessary risk
accompanying the competence. 156
While most actual cases involving the EU seem to focus on the
attribution of conduct, there is also support for a competence-based
approach in international jurisprudence. Interestingly enough, these
cases provide evidence not so much through the pronouncements of
the judicial decisions themselves, but rather through the choice of
respondents by the claimants. In a number of cases, applicants
brought complaints against the EU with regard to Member States'
conduct when such conduct was not taken pursuant to EU law. In
these cases, the EU did not object to the role of respondent, nor did
the respective adjudicatory bodies overrule the applicants' choice.

155.
In addition to judicial economy, this has the added benefit of not interfering
with the autonomy of the EU legal order (and the CJEU's exclusive power to adjudicate
on such matters, in order to protect that autonomy), which is a concern occasionally
raised in discussions on investor-state dispute settlement in extra-EU IIAs. See, e.g.,
Reinisch, supra note 46, at 34-38. To preserve that autonomy, TFEU Article 344
mandates that EU "Member States undertake not to submit a dispute concerning the
interpretation or application of the Treaties to any method of settlement other than
those provided for therein." TFEU, supra note 5, art. 344; see also Opinion 1/91, supra
note 129; see Electrabel S.A. v. Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/19,
Decision on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law and Liability,
4.151-166 (Nov. 30, 2012)
(proclaiming that this obligation, however, is only placed on EU Member States, with
no corresponding obligation on investors).
156.
See Steinberger, supranote 132, at 854.
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Perhaps the most notable example is the EC-Asbestos case
brought before a WTO panel, which concerned a French ban on
asbestos, an entirely domestic measure that nonetheless affected
international trade.' 5 7 As trade in goods falls under exclusive EU
competence, the measure was defended by the EU acting as
respondent-France did not even have a role as co-respondent. 15 8
Similarly, in EC-Biotech, the EU acted as the sole respondent
defending a range of restrictions on the import of genetically modified
products, while only some of these measures originated from the EU
itself and the complainants had brought their claim against several
individual Member States in addition to the EU.' 59 Examples are also
not limited to WTO case law: the Swordfish case was initiated by
Chile under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea against the EU
for the conduct of Spanish fishing vessels, as the EU has exclusive
competence over "the conservation of maritime resources." 160
3.

Preliminary Conclusion on Attribution

Why did the EU choose to defend these measures instead of
letting the Member State produce its own defense? The answer lies as
much in the internal power struggles of the EU as in the "external"
issue of responsibility under international law. As pointed out in the
WTO context, "the [EU] is eager to take up responsibility," and while
this may appear counterintuitive, the "main reason for the [EU]'s

157.
See Panel Report, European Communities-MeasuresAffecting Asbestos and
Products Containing Asbestos, WT/DS135/R (Sept. 18, 2000) [Hereinafter EC-Asbestos]
(reporting on a measure between Canada and European Communities regarding
France's ban on asbestos); Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Measures
Affecting Asbestos and Products Containing Asbestos, WT/DS135/AB[R (Mar. 12, 2001)
(reporting on Canada's appeal of certain issues in the Panel Report in European
Communities-MeasuresAffecting Asbestos and Products ContainingAsbestos).
158.
See Hoffmeister, supra note 140, at 737; EC-Asbestos, supra note 159,
1.1.
See Panel Report, European Communities-Measures Affecting the
159.
Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, WT/DS291/R, WT/DS292/R, WT/DS293/R
(Sept. 29, 2006) (noting that complainants were the US, Canada and Argentina;
respondents were (in addition to the EU) Austria, Germany, France, Italy, Greece and
Luxembourg).
See Conservation and Sustainable Exploitation of Swordfish Stocks in the
160.
South-Eastern Pacific Ocean (Chile v. Eur. Community), Case No. 7, Order of Dec. 20,
https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case-no_7/
ITLOS,
2000,
Ord.2000.3.E.pdf [http://perma.cc/KLL5-W77E] (archived Sept. 14, 2014) (noting the
Order of the case); Hoffmeister, supra note 140, at 738. The case never came to a
judgment, as it was ultimately settled. See Conservation and Sustainable Exploitation
of Swordfish Stocks in the South-Eastern Pacific Ocean (Chile v. E.U.), Case No. 7,
Order of Dec. 16, 2009, ITLOS, http://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/
cases/case_no_7/Ord.2009.1-16.12.09.E.pdf [http://perma.cc/EQ2F-2J3Z] (archived Sept.
14, 2014) (explaining settlement of case).
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eagerness may well be the European Commission's quest for
integration and for international confirmation and acceptance of the
[EU] as such."16 1 The same (or similar) dynamics can be detected in
the case of investment, as well. With regard to trade, "[tlhe
Commission vigorously battled to have the [European] Court of
Justice say that the [EU] had sole competence in WTO matters,"162
and now the same kind of approach can be seen in the Commission's
explanatory memorandum to the Proposed Regulation, in which it
claims exclusive competence over all investment-related matters.
There is a major difference, however, between trade and
investment law. As described in the WTO Dispute Settlement
Understanding:
The aim of the dispute settlement mechanism is to secure a positive
solution to a dispute. . . . In the absence of a mutually agreed solution,
the first objective of the dispute settlement mechanism is usually to
secure the withdrawal of the measures concerned if these are found to
be inconsistent with the provisions of any of the covered agreements.
The provision of compensation should be resorted to only if the
immediate withdrawal of the measure is impracticable and as a
temporary measure pending the withdrawal of the measure which is
inconsistent with a covered agreement. 163

In contrast, the goal of investment arbitration is first and foremost to
secure compensation for the individual investor when the host state
violates the terms of an IIA. The financial implications are
significant, to say the least (awards often reach tens or even
hundreds of millions of dollars), which is exactly what motivated the
Commission in proposing the draft Regulation.1 64 In other words, the
Commission may be eager to act as respondent. However, the
Commission may also be equally eager to recover (at least part of) the
award from the Member State, where the treatment in question was
(at least partly) accorded by the Member State.
In sum, it appears difficult to distil a uniform approach or
general rule concerning the basis of determination of responsibility of
international organizations from the case law. Unless arbitral
tribunals decide to develop their own approach, there is a fair chance
that the WTO case law will be seen as more instructive than ECtHR
jurisprudence, if only because the types of cases are generally more
similar as they relate to economic matters. Even so, it remains to be

See Eeckhout, supra note 148, at 456 (noting the EU's eagerness to take
161.
responsibility and conclusions derived from this initiative).
162.
Id.
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
163.
Disputes art. 3, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401 (quoting the rules and procedures on
settlement of disputes).
See Proposed Regulation, supra note 9 (highlighting the title and
164.
explanatory memorandum of the Proposed Regulation).
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seen to what extent the WTO's pragmatism could translate into the
different system of investment arbitration.
C. Compliance with the ArbitralAward
The third and final problem that had been raised by the
Regulation relates to the final stage of dispute settlement, namely
compliance with the arbitral award. Such award could either entail
the tribunal's "stamp of approval" on a settlement reached by the
parties, or it could be a decision holding the respondent responsible
for breach of the IIA. In the latter case, two possible remedies could
be prescribed: the payment of compensation or a specific performance
(withdrawal of a measure or execution of a contract, for example). All
of this could be straightforwardly implemented in case the
respondent was the Member State which extended the violatory
treatment. However, under the Proposed Regulation, as well as the
ultimately adopted Regulation, the Commission would most likely be
the sole respondent in the majority of cases, while implementation
would have to be executed (at least partly) by the Member States.
Under such circumstances, smooth implementation is likely to be
much less self-evident than the Proposed Regulation seemed to
assume. Furthermore, the situation had to be addressed in which an
arbitral award was not voluntarily complied with and the investor
had to resort to judicial enforcement. Some of these questions have
been tackled under the Regulation, which was formulated following
the "trilogue" among the Commission, the Council, and the
Parliament.
1.

Settlement by the Parties

In international law, as in national law, it is possible that the
parties in dispute reach a mutually acceptable agreement middispute. In such cases, it often does not make sense to continue with
the litigation, so the terms of agreement are set in writing and the
adjudicatory body (in the present case, the arbitral tribunal) may be
asked to rubber-stamp them so that they obtain the legal validity of a
final award.
When it comes to reaching a settlement, the Proposed Regulation
distinguished between two situations: "settlement of disputes
concerning treatment afforded exclusively by the Union" and that
extended (fully or in part) by a Member State. 165 Whereas the

165.
See Proposed Regulation, supra note 9, arts. 12-13 (distinguishing between
dispute settlement "concerning treatment afforded by the Union" and those "concerning
treatment afforded by the Member State).
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provisions regarding the former case remained practically intact
under the Regulation, provisions with regard to the settlement of
disputes concerning treatment afforded by a Member State have been
radically amended. These provisions circumscribe the Commission's
powers and elaborating on the grounds of financial responsibility
incurred.
In case of settlement of disputes concerning treatment afforded
by the Union, the Commission has the discretion to decide whether
such settlement "would be in the interests of the Union," in which
case it may adopt an implementing act to this extent in accordance
with the examination procedure of Regulation 182/2011.166 This
seems logical: when the EU has breached its obligations, the EU can
accept a settlement. However, problems may arise in practice if such
settlement would involve "action other than the payment of a
monetary sum." 167 In such cases, cooperation of the Member State(s)
can be required who may not have agreed with the decision to
settle. 168
Even more questions might arise with respect to the second
situation, i.e., in case of settlement of disputes concerning treatment
afforded (in full or in part) by a Member State. Here the Regulation
provides that:
Where the Union is the respondent in a dispute concerning treatment
afforded, whether fully or in part, by a Member State, and the
Commission considers that the settlement of the dispute would be in
the financial interests of the Union, the Commission shall first consult
with the Member State concerned pursuant to Article 6. The Member
169
State may also initiate such consultations with the Commission.

Hence, although the Commission must consult with the Member
State, it does not have to follow the opinion of the Member State in
account when deciding upon the settlement. If the Commission and
the Member State concerned agree to settle the dispute (in
accordance with the terms negotiated by the Commission), the
Member State has to "endeavour to enter into an arrangement with
the Commission setting out the necessary elements for the
negotiation and implementation of the settlement." 170 In other words,
the burden falls upon the Member State to get agreement from the

166.
See Regulation, supra note 10, art. 13(1) (discussing discretion given to the
Commission when settlement of a dispute is exclusively afforded by the Union).
167.
Id. art. 13(2) (quoting the Final Regulation).
168.
This situation will be examined further below, in the section on
implementation of remedies. See infra notes 190-203 and accompanying text.
169.
Regulation, supranote 10, art. 14(1) (referring to the "financial interests" of
the EU). But see Proposed Regulation, supra note 9, art. 13(1) (referring merely to the
"interests of the Union").
170.
Regulation, supra note 10, art. 14(2) (quoting the Final Regulation).
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Commission, even though the ultimate financial consequences of the
settlement might have to be shouldered by the State.
In the same vein, if the Member State has confirmed to the
Commission its intention not to act as a respondent, the Commission
may opt for the settlement of the dispute, following consultations
with the Member State concerned. Such a course of action rests on
the provision that "the settlement is in the financial interests" of the
EU which is to be indicated by "a full and balanced factual analysis
and legal reasoning."1 7 '
The major amendment under the Regulation has been deleting
the provision according to which "[i]n the event that the Member
State does not consent to settle the dispute, the Commission may
settle the dispute where overriding interests of the Union so
require."17 2 This is a welcome development, especially in light of the
fact that the original draft of the Proposed Regulation had no
definition of what these "overriding interests" could entail. 7 3 Thus,
the Proposed Regulation gave the Commission a significant margin of
appreciation on whether to settle or not, and under which conditions.
However, it must be noted that this was mitigated to an extent by the
so-called examination procedure that needed to be followed in order
74
for the Commission's decision to settle to be approved.1
In contrast, according to the Regulation, the decision on the
settlement of disputes concerning treatment afforded (in full or in
part) by a Member State is largely dependent on the subject that
would incur the financial responsibility. More specifically, the
following scenarios may come into play:
(i)

if a Member State alone would bear financial responsibility,
75
only that Member State may settle the dispute;1

Id. art. 14(4) (quoting the Final Regulation).
171.
Proposed Regulation, supra note 9, art. 13(3) (emphasis added) (quoting
172.
provision deleted from the Final Regulation).
This was later rectified through an amendment by the European
173.
Parliament defining overriding interests. See Amendments Adopted by the European
Parliament on 23 May 2013 on the Proposal for a Regulation of the European
Parliament and of the Council Establishing a Framework for Managing Financial
Responsibility Linked to Investor-State Dispute Settlement Tribunals Established by
International Agreements to which the European Union is Party, amend. 19, COM
(2012) 0335 final (May 23, 2013), available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/
2 9
2
getDoc.do?type=TA&1anguage=EN&reference=P7-TA- 013- 1 [http://perma.cc/TQ4Jin Amendment 19).
interests'
'overriding
(defining
14,
2014)
Sept.
EV5] (archived
See Proposed Regulation, supra note 9, art. 13(4) ("[T]he terms of the
174.
settlement agreed shall be approved in accordance with the examination procedure
referred to in Article 20(3).").
See Regulation, supra note 10, art. 14(3) (emphasizing that the party
175.
bearing financial responsibility holds settlement authority).
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(ii)

if the Commission has taken the decision that the EU is to
act as a respondent pursuant to Article 9(2) and the
financial responsibility is exclusively to be borne by the EU,
the Commission may decide to settle the dispute; 176

(iii)

if the Commission has taken the decision that the EU is to
act as respondent pursuant to Article 9(2) and the financial
responsibility is to be borne by both the EU and a Member
State, "the Commission may not settle the dispute without
the agreement of the Member State concerned" while the
latter "may submit a full analysis of the impact of the
proposed settlement on its financial interests."177 In case
the Member State opposes the settlement, "the Commission
may nonetheless decide to settle provided that such
settlement does not have any financial or budgetary
implications for the Member State concerned on the basis of
a full and balanced factual analysis and legal reasoning,
taking account of the Member State analysis and
demonstrating the financial interests of the Union and of
the Member State concerned."178 In essence, this means
that the Commission may choose to settle the dispute
without the Member State's agreement if it assumes the
burden of the entire settlement amount.

Importantly, the Regulation provides that the terms of
settlement under Article 14(4)-(6) shall not include actions by the
"Member State concerned other than the payment of a monetary
sum" (namely, a specific performance such as withdrawal of a
measure or execution of a contract). 179
Finally, the decision to settle (taken either by the Commission or
the Member State concerned) is subject to approval by means of an
implementing act in accordance with the examination procedure,
which implies that a committee composed of Member State
representatives is established to deliver a binding opinion by weighed
majority.18 0 This ensures that all Member States (not merely those
involved in the dispute) have a say in a settlement. The fact that this
opinion is delivered by weighed majority also implies that the opinion
of large Member States may prevail over that of smaller ones, even
where only the latter are affected by the settlement.

176.
See id. art. 14(5) (highlighting other scenarios of settlement authority).
177.
See id. art. 14(6) (highlighting other scenarios of settlement authority).
178.
Id.
179.
See id. art. 14(7) (limiting actions to payment of monetary sums).
180.
See id. art. 14(8) (referring to art. 22(3), which in turn refers to the
examination procedure as detailed in Regulation (EU) No. 182/2011 of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 2011 Laying Down the Rules and
General Principles Concerning Mechanisms for Control by Member States of the
Commission's Exercise of Implementing Powers, 2011 O.J. (L 55) 13, art. 5).
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A welcome move is the removal of the Proposed Regulation's
provision that permitted settlement of the dispute by the Commission
on the basis of the EU's ambiguous "overriding interests" in the case
of non-consenting Member States. The retention of this provision
would have afforded the Commission far-reaching discretion. Rather,
making the decision to settle dependent on the subject that would
bear the financial responsibility strikes a fair balance, taking into
account the sovereign rights and the right of defense of the Member
States concerned. Moreover, the need to avoid undue interference
with the Members States' powers has been addressed through
rendering as a condition the cooperation between the Commission
and the Member States, as well as the provision of sufficient and
rational justification for any decision made by the Commission.
In cases where the Union is the respondent and a Member State
wishes to settle, the Regulation distinguishes between disputes
regarding treatment afforded exclusively by the Member State and
those regarding treatment afforded in part by the Member State. This
is different from the Proposed Regulation, which only provided the
Member State with the possibility to settle when the treatment was
exclusively afforded by that Member State.' 8 '
When it comes to a dispute concerning treatment exclusively
afforded by a Member State, that Member State may settle the
dispute subject to the following conditions:
(a) [it] accepts any potential financial responsibility arising from the
settlement;
(b) any settlement arrangement is enforceable only against the Member
State; and
(c) the terms of the settlement are compatible with the law of the
Union.

182

Even in the event of such a Member State-induced settlement,
however, the Commission remains in control, since the Member State
must submit to the Commission any draft settlement arrangement for
approval.' 8 3 But if the draft settlement is approved, "the Commission

See Proposed Regulation, supra note 9, art. 14(1) (highlighting changed
181.
language from Proposed Regulation).
Regulation, supra note 10, art. 15(1) (quoting the Final Regulation on
182.
conditions of settlement); see also Proposed Regulation, supra note 9, art. 14(1)(d)
(making any such settlement conditional on there being "no overriding interest of the
Union against the settlement"). But see Regulation, supra note 10; Proposed
Regulation, supra note 9; supra text accompanying note 175 (illustrating removal of
references to "overriding interests"); supra text accompanying notes 173-75.
See Regulation, supra note 10, art. 15(3) ("[T]he Member State shall notify
183.
the Commission of the draft settlement arrangement"); see also supra text
accompanying notes 173-75.
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shall take all necessary steps to make the settlement arrangements
effective."1 84
In the case of disputes arising from treatment afforded in part by
a Member State, if the Member State considers that the settlement
would be in its financial interest, it shall consult with the
Commission first.18 5 "If the Commission and the Member State
concerned agree to settle the dispute" (in accordance with the terms
negotiated by the Member State), the Member State has to
"endeavour to enter into an arrangement with the Commission
setting out the necessary elements for the negotiation and
implementation of the settlement."186 On the contrary, when the
Commission opposes the settlement, it may decide to refuse to settle
on the grounds of "a full and balanced factual analysis and legal
reasoning" provided to Member States by means of an implementing
act in accordance with the examination procedure of Regulation
182/2011.187
2.

Implementation of Remedies

Two main remedies exist in international law, as applied in the
context of investor-state arbitration: payment of compensation and
mandatory performance. The latter, although long put forward as the
preferred remedy under international law as it is intended to recreate
the situation which would have existed had the wrongful act not
taken place, 8 8 is rarely prescribed by arbitral tribunals. The most

184.
Regulation, supranote 10, art. 15(3).
185.
See id. art. 16(1) (noting that the Member State must consult the
Commission first if the Member State believes the settlement would be in its financial
interest).
186.
Id. art. 16(2).
187.
See id. art. 16(3) (denoting the steps the Commission must take in refusing
to consent to the settlement).
188.
See Factory at Chorz6w (Germ. v. Pol.), 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17, at 47
(Sept. 13), which contains the following seminal passage on restitution in international
law:
The essential principle contained in the notion of an illegal act - a principle
which seems to be established by international practice and in particular by the
decisions of arbitral tribunals - is that reparation must, as far as possible, wipe
out all the consequences of the illegal act and re-establish the situation which
would, in all probability, have existed if that act had not been committed.
Restitution in kind, or, if this not possible, payment of a sum corresponding to
the value which a restitution in kind would bear; the award, if need be, of
damages for loss sustained which would not be covered by restitution in kind or
payment in place of it - such are the principles which should serve to
determine the amount of compensation due for an act contrary to international
law.
See generally ARSIWA, supra note 71, arts. 34-35 (discussing State's responsibility of
reparation and restitution).
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common remedy-and hence the one to be expected in investor-EU
arbitrations-is compensation. The sections below deal with
compensation and performance both in case of settlement as well as
fully-litigated disputes, where the EU acted as respondent.
a.

Payment of Compensation

i.

(External) Payment to the Investor

From the investor's perspective, the payment of compensationat least as a matter of law-is clear-cut. In case there is disagreement
between the Union and the Member State regarding the allocation of
financial responsibility, the investor entitled to compensation will be
paid by the Commission from the budget of the Union. In the words of
the Regulation:
The Commission should consult closely with the Member State
concerned in order to reach agreement on the apportionment of
financial responsibility. Where the Commission determines that a
Member State is responsible, and the Member State does not accept
that determination, the Commission should pay the award, but should
also address a decision to the Member State requesting it to provide the
amounts concerned to the budget of the Union, together with applicable
interest. The interest payable should be that set down pursuant to
Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012 of the European Parliament
189
and of the Council.

This pragmatism is also reflected in the Regulation's relevant
provisions on the payment procedure, which are remarkably
straightforward. In cases where the EU has acted as respondent, the
investor may simply "present a request to the Commission for
payment" and the latter will settle the bill-unless the Member State
already accepted full financial responsibility at an earlier stage, in
190
which case the Member State will pay.

Regulation, supra note 10, T 20 (quoting language from the Final
189.
Regulation). The softer language of the text here ('should' rather than 'shall') is
explained by the fact that the quote is from one of the recitals of the Regulation, and
not the articles themselves.
See Regulation, supra note 10, art. 17 (discussing final payments of dispute
190.
where Union acts as respondent). The Member State always has the possibility of
accepting "any potential financial responsibility arising from the arbitration" in cases
where the EU acts as respondent. The Member State may then enter into
arrangements with the Commission "dealing with, inter alia, (a) mechanisms for the
periodic payment of costs arising from the arbitration; (b) mechanisms for the payment
of any award made against the Union." Id. art. 12. It is not explicitly addressed in the
regulation what happens if the Member State decides not to honor its previous
commitment accepting financial liability. However, in that case, it is likely that the
procedure outlined in Article 19 of the Regulation would apply by analogy. In other
words, the Commission would pay the award to the investor, and it would adopt a
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Internal Allocation of Costs

While outwardly, the Commission-if it has acted as
respondent-will almost always be the one paying the compensation,
the same is not true internally. The Regulation lays down the
following apportionment criteria in Article 3(1) for the internal
allocation of costs arising from dispute settlement:
(a) the Union shall bear the financial responsibility arising from
treatment afforded by the institutions, bodies or agencies of the
Union;
(b) the Member State concerned shall bear the financial responsibility
arising from treatment afforded by that Member State;
(c) by way of exception to point (b), the Union shall bear the financial
responsibility arising from treatment afforded by a Member State
where such treatment was required by Union law.
Notwithstanding point (c) of the first subparagraph, where the Member
State concerned is required to act pursuant to the law of the Union in
order to remedy the inconsistency with the law of the Union of a prior
act, that Member State shall be financially responsible unless the
adoption of such prior act was required by Union law. 19 1

The Regulation explains the rationale behind this apportionment as
follows:
Where the Union, as an entity having legal personality, has
international responsibility for the treatment afforded, it will be
expected, as a matter of international law, to pay any adverse award
and bear the costs of any dispute. However, an adverse award may
potentially flow either from treatment afforded by the Union itself or
from treatment afforded by a Member State. It would as a consequence
be inequitable if awards and the costs of arbitration were to be paid
from the budget of the Union where the treatment was afforded by a
Member State, unless the treatment in question is required by Union
law. It is therefore necessary that financial responsibility be allocated,
as a matter of Union law, between the Union itself and the Member
State responsible for the treatment afforded on the basis of criteria
established by this Regulation.192

In other words, where the wrongful treatment exclusively originates
in a Member State, the Member State in question has to pay the costs
flowing from dispute settlement. Similarly, where the treatment
originates in the EU institutions (including where the measure in
question was adopted by a Member State as required by EU law),
financial responsibility will be borne by the Union. All this is logical,
except for one detail: the Member State has to take on the burden in
all cases where it acts to "remedy [an] inconsistency with the law of
decision addressed to the Member State requiring the latter to pay the full amount into
the EU budget.
191.
Regulation, supra note 10, art. 3(1) (quoting language from the Regulation
regarding apportionment of financial responsibility).
192.
Id. T 5 (quoting language from Final Regulation on rationale behind
apportionment of financial responsibility).
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the Union of a prior act," where EU law did not require that prior act.
Such a need to remedy an inconsistency can occur either with change
originating in a Member State or with change originating at the EU
level. An example of the former can be the passing of new legislation
by an existing Member State or the accession of a new Member State,
which has to bring its laws into conformity with the EU's acquis
communautaire.193 The latter can happen when the EU gains new
competences and adopts legislation in an area that it has not
previously regulated. In both cases, it is indeed the responsibility of
the Member States to ensure conformity of their laws with the
existing acquis at any given time. 194 But while it is reasonable to
expect the Member State to assume financial responsibility for
remedying inconsistencies resulting from its own actions, it does not
seem fair to put the financial burden on the individual Member State
where it has acted pursuant to new EU-wide legislation.
If the Commission, having acted as respondent, thinks the
Member State should shoulder at least part of the financial
19 5
responsibility, the two must start consultations on the matter.
They have three months to reach an agreement, otherwise the
Commission will decide the amount to be paid by the Member State
unilaterally.196 The latter then has to pay into the EU budget within
six months (with interest, where applicable), or it has two months to
object.' 9 7 If the Member State objects, "and the Commission disagrees
with the .

. objection," it will adopt another decision within six

months, requiring the Member State to reimburse the EU budget
(with interest).198 The Regulation only covers the possibility of an

The acquis communautaireis, in the words of FAIRHURST, supra note 34, at
193.
761, "the total body of Union law accumulated so far." New Member States generally
have to achieve most of this conformity before accession, but they are often granted
moratoria on certain issues, with the understanding that they have to achieve
conformity within a few years after accession. With regard to legislation by an existing
Member State, it is also possible that an old law of a Member State is not in conformity
with the acquis, but this inconformity has not come to light before; in such a case, the
same rules would apply as with new legislation.
See generally TEU, supra note 5 (emphasizing the general duty of
194.
cooperation laid out in the treaty).
See Regulation, supra note 10, art. 19(2) (noting that, if necessary, the
195.
Member State and Union should immediately engage in consultations to determine
financial responsibility).
See id. art. 19(3) (outlining time limitations and other steps in reaching
196.
agreement on financial responsibility).
See id. art. 19(4) (outlining time limitations and other steps in reaching
197.
agreement on financial responsibility).
See id. art. 19(5) (outlining time limitations and other steps in reaching
198.
agreement on financial responsibility). It is not entirely clear from the Regulation
whether the Commission may take more than six months to decide if it indeed
disagrees with the objection.
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objection lodged with the Commission itself, but the Member State
may also have further-judicial--options to challenge the decision, as
discussed below in Section IV.
Nonetheless, all of this is of fairly little relevance to the foreign
investor who will be paid within the agreed time from the EU budget.
The further apportionment of the compensation amount is a matter of
internal law, which could be subject to further discussion and even
litigation at the EU level. The situation is different, however, in cases
where an arbitral tribunal would not (only) prescribe the payment of
compensation but (also) a certain act of performance.
b.

Specific Performance

In theory, the general rule under international law regarding
remedies is that, in the first place, the wrongdoing state or
international organization must try to "re-establish the situation as it
existed before the wrongful act was committed."1 99 Only to the extent
that damage is not made good by restitution does an international
obligation arise for the state or international organization responsible
to compensate for the damage caused by the internationally wrongful
act.200
In practice, however, international courts and tribunals only
rarely resort to prescribing a specific performance-even less so in
investor-state arbitration. 201 Should an investor-state tribunal
nonetheless decide to prescribe a specific performance, such as the
issuance or extension of a license, the provision of protection, or the
execution of a contract, this may prove to be problematic for the
investor. What works so simply and elegantly in the case of
compensation (the EU pays and is later reimbursed by the Member
State) does not provide a feasible solution when it comes to specific
performance. Depending on the measure required, it may well be the
199.
See ARSIWA, supra note 71, art. 35 (noting when a State is under
obligation to make restitution); ARIO, supra note 125, art. 35 (noting when an
international organization is under obligation to make restitution). Both sets of articles
stipulate that states/international organizations are obliged to make restitution
"provided and to the extent that restitution: (a) is not materially impossible; (b) does
not involve a burden out of all proportion to the benefit deriving from restitution
instead of compensation." See also Chorz6w Factory, supra note 190, at 48.
200.
See ARSIWA, supra note 71, art. 36(1) (noting when the need for
compensation arises on the part of a state); ARIO, supra note 125, art. 36(1) (noting
when the need for compensation arises on the part of an international organization).
201.
See generally BORZU SABAHI, COMPENSATION AND RESTITUTION IN
INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE (2011). As noted above,
according to the technical summary of the Canada-EU FTA, an investment tribunal
"cannot order the repeal of the host state's measure," although it "may order an award,
separately or in combination, for damages or restitution of property, as well as costs."
Technical Summary, supra note 68, at 15. This is confirmed in the Consolidated CETA
Text, supra note 68, art. X.36.
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case that only the Member State is able to comply with the award.
But if the Member State did not willingly let itself be represented by
the Commission acting as respondent, if it did not consent to a
settlement, or if it did not agree with the defense strategy adopted by
the Commission-it could well refuse such compliance. In that case,
the investor would have to resort to recognition and judicial
enforcement procedures before domestic courts.
3.

Recognition, Enforcement, and Execution

Where a Member State has acted as respondent, the general
rules on recognition and enforcement as stipulated in the ICSID
Convention, the New York Convention, or the UNCITRAL Model Law
on International Commercial Arbitration apply. 202 In effect, this
203
means that insofar as recognition and enforcement are concerned,
arbitral awards have to be dealt with by domestic courts as final and
binding decisions of the highest court of the land. 204 However, the

See ICSID Convention, supra note 27 (noting that provisions of the
202.
"Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals
of Other States - International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes" will
apply); New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, June 10, 1958, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 (noting that the provisions of the "Convention
on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards" will apply); see also
Freya Baetens, Enforcement of Arbitral Awards: "to ICSID or not to ICSID" is Not the
Question, 5 INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 211 (2011).
See generally UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, with
Amendments as Adopted in 2006, GAOR 40th Sess., Supp. No. 17, UN Doc. A/40/17
(1985), amended by U.N. GAOR 61st Sess., Supp. No. 17, UN Doc. A/61/17 (2006),
consolidated version available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/englishltexts/arbitration/mlarb/07-86998_Ebook.pdf.
As a general rule, one should distinguish between the recognition and
203.
enforcement of an arbitral award on the one hand, and its execution on the other.
Although domestic practice may vary to a certain degree, the first step of "recognition"
is the formal acknowledgement of an arbitral award as a final and binding disposition
of contested claims. Its primary purpose is to certify the res judicataeffect of an award
as applying in the domestic context so that the award becomes enforceable. The third
(and last) step in the process of a contested arbitral award is "execution," i.e. the
prevailing party's actual collection of compensation or the achievement of other relief
granted by the award. The second step of "enforcement" is less precise. In many
domestic legal systems it will mean formally declaring in an order that an arbitral
award is in fact enforceable within the domestic sphere. In such systems, the first and
second step will generally be subsumed under a single proceeding termed "exequatur"
proceeding - exequatur literally meaning "this has to be enforced." In other legal
systems, enforcement may more loosely refer to the creditor's legal rights to execute the
award as set out above. See LuCY REED, JAN PAULSSON & NIGEL BLACKABY, GUIDE TO

ICSID ARBITRATION 179-90 (2d ed. 2011) (elaborating on recognition and enforcement
of arbitral awards in the ICSID context).
See ICSID Convention, supra note 27, art. 54(1) (mandating that each
204.
contracting state shall recognize an award rendered pursuant to the ICSID
Convention). Although the New York Convention does not contain a corresponding
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execution phase of an arbitral award will not be shielded from
domestic laws, even if the award is treaty-based. Thus, the
domestically applicable doctrines of (relative or absolute) immunity
from execution will have to be complied with-and may adversely
affect an investor's chances of actually collecting compensation. A
clear example of this practice is provided by Articles 54(3) and 55 of
the ICSID Convention, stipulating that:
Execution of the award shall be governed by the laws concerning the
execution of judgments in force in the State in whose territories such
execution is sought.
Nothing in Article 54 shall be construed as derogating from the law in
force in any Contracting State relating to immunity of that State or of
any foreign State from execution.

With respect to execution, the most favorable situation for an investor
is if the domestic courts apply the doctrine of relative immunity, in
which case commercial assets of a state may be executed (unlike
assets of a state destined for public service). 205
An investor may also face difficulties relating to execution in
cases where the EU (by means of the Commission) has acted as
respondent. In the territory of the EU, the Protocol on the Privileges
and Immunities of the EU applies, according to which "[t]he property
and assets of the Union shall not be the subject of any administrative
or legal measure of constraint without the authorisation of the Court
of Justice [of the European Union]. "206 Execution against Union
assets would therefore require the investor to bring its request before
the CJEU. In such a case, the Commission considers that:
[T]he Court of Justice would apply the standard approach on sovereign
immunity to such situations, with the result that the situation within
the Union would be comparable to the situation in other countries,
including the Member States of the European Union, where the
international principle of sovereign immunity from execution would
2 07
come into play.

In other words, even in cases where the EU has waived its immunity
to jurisdiction in advance to all disputes arising under its IIAs, it may
provision, in practice it operates much the same way. See Baetens, supra note 202, at
216 et seq.
205.
The doctrine of relative immunity is not yet accepted by all States, but
certain trends in this direction are discernible. See, e.g., Convention on Jurisdictional
Immunities of States, opened for signature Jan. 17, 2005, 44 I.L.M. 803 (2005) (not yet
in force) (exempting "property ... specifically in use or intended for use by the State for
other than government non-commercial purposes"). A contrario, property that is used
by the State for commercial purposes is not covered by State immunity from execution.
206.
Protocol on the Privileges and Immunities of the European Union, art. 1,
2012 O.J. (C 326) 266 (quoting regulations on the property and assets of the Union); see
also TFEU, supra note 5, art. 343 (noting that the Union shall enjoy the privileges and
immunities in Member States as necessary for performance of Union's tasks).
207.
Explanatory memorandum to the Proposed Regulation, supra note 9, at 8
(quoting language on the application of sovereign immunity).
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maintain immunity with respect to enforcement actions. As a result,
an investor would not be able to execute the award against EU assets
if the CJEU favors the doctrine of absolute immunity. A less strict
approach would entail that EU assets could be seized as long as they
are not needed by the Union to exercise its essential functions. But
even in this case, enforcement could be difficult because, unlike
states, the EU does not have many such "superfluous" assets either
within or outside of the EU territory, due to the conferred nature of
the EU's competences and corresponding budgets. 208 That said, "there
are no recorded cases of the Union or of its Member States refusing to
respect an award," 209 and there is no element making such refusals
likely to occur in the future.
1V. RECOURSE FOR MEMBER STATES DISSATISFIED WITH THE
RESPONDENT

EU AS

Finally, this Article briefly addresses the means of recourse
offered to Member States affected by the award 210 but does not agree
with the Commission's defense strategy decisions or its
apportionment of financial responsibility in the particular case.
If the Member State deems that its rights have not been well
represented-because the Commission, acting as respondent, did not
adequately represent the Member State's interests-it could
potentially initiate proceedings against the Commission before the

See, e.g., TEU, supra note 5, art. 5, at 269 (limiting powers to those
208.
provided in the treaties, and providing for the EU to be financed only from own
resources received from Member States). In other words, the EU receives specific funds
from Member States to undertake specific activities, leaving residual powers and the
linked possibility to build up financial surpluses, which can be used for commercial
activities in the hands of Member States.
Explanatory memorandum to the Proposed Regulation, supra note 9, at 8
209.
("While there are no recorded cases of the Union or of its Member States refusing to
respect an award, if an investor were to consider it necessary to seek recognition or
enforcement of an award, it would need to seek such recognition or enforcement via the
courts of the Member States.").
In all cases where the Commission acts as respondent, one or more Member
210.
State(s) will necessarily be affected by the award. If a Member State has to pay (part
of) the compensation or carry out certain specific performance, then that state will be
affected; if the EU has to pay (part of) the compensation or carry out certain specific
performance, then all Member States will (indirectly) be affected. If compensation has
to be paid from the EU budget, this affects all Member States, as they contribute to the
budget; that said, the amount of compensation would have to be high enough (even as
divided between individual Member States) to make it worth incurring the costs of
litigation before the CJEU. In view of these circumstances, this section focuses on the
scenario where the Member State which could have been (or indeed was) respondent
itself is affected.
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CJEU.2 11 These proceedings, in which other Member States could
possibly intervene, would have to be aimed against an act of the
Commission, such as an agreement to settle or the apportionment of
financial responsibility arising from the award. The CJEU could then
potentially annul the Commission's decision. The chance of success
remains doubtful, however, as it would seem difficult for a Member
State to prove that its own defense strategy would have secured a
better result, by means of a (more) favorable award or settlement. 2 12
In any case, even if the CJEU were to render a judgment in favor of
the complaining Member State, this is merely an internal matter and
would not annul the award (or affect the investor).
The Member State may also decide to contest the apportionment
of the compensation, rather than the defense strategy. However, the
Member State in that case will have to claim misapplication of the
criteria or even challenge the Regulation itself.213 If the Member
State is successful, the CJEU may re-apportion the costs, assigning a
greater share to the EU budget. In the absence of a legislative
amendment to the Regulation, this may rectify the problem,
highlighted above, of pushing financial responsibility on the Member
States when they act pursuant to new EU-wide legislation due to the
expansion of EU competences.

V. CONCLUSION

The EU's newly acquired competence over foreign investment
poses largely unprecedented legal challenges: the Union's unique
structure and functioning are bound to raise questions about the
traditional format of international investor-state arbitration.
Anticipating these challenges, the European Commission put forward
a Proposed Regulation on managing financial responsibility arising
out of such arbitrations, which was adopted after amendment by the
European Parliament and the Council of the EU in 2014.

211.
See TFEU, supra note 5, art. 263 (noting that the CJEU has jurisdiction on
cases brought by Member States "on grounds of lack of competence, infringement of an
essential procedural requirement, infringement of the Treaties or of any rule of law
relating to their application, or misuse of powers").
212.
However, if there is proof of a settlement offer, turned down by the
Commission, from the investor with better conditions (e.g., a lesser amount of
compensation) than the final award, this would offer an easy way to monetize strategy
decisions. The question then becomes if and to what extent the CJEU would be
receptive to the idea of "penalizing" the Commission for a bad defense strategy by
making it pay the difference.
213.
Since this would be an internal EU law case before the CJEU, in such a
case the Regulation will be applicable pursuant to EU law - the problems highlighted
above regarding its non-inclusion in the IIA do not apply.
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The stakes are high, and the Regulation, acknowledged to be
"one of the key elements in the creation of an EU investment
policy," 214 reflects policy choices in all its major aspects. It places a
high value on investor-friendliness, which helps explain why the
Regulation aims to determine who is to be the single respondent in a
given case (sparing the investor the dilemma of choosing) and why
the Commission is willing to pay the full compensation awarded when
it acts as respondent, only reclaiming (part of) it later from the
Member State. Time-and an inevitable stream of cases-will tell
whether all of these policy choices were justified. Excluding the
option of joint responsibility, for example, may have the unintended
consequence of complicating, rather than simplifying, the
proceedings.
In any event, whatever good intentions the Commission may
have had towards investors, the policy choices made in its proposal
are explained in no small part by the internal EU dynamics at play.
With the EU having gained exclusive competence over foreign direct
investment, the Commission is eager to solidify its position as the
EU's representative, much like it has been the case with trade. But
while there is an undeniable similarity with trade, there is a
remarkable difference between the respective dispute settlement
mechanisms. The implications of a trade case can also easily reach
millions or even billions of dollars, but a lost case usually results
"only" in an obligation to modify certain measures, and not the direct
payment of compensation. These two factors-the Commission's need
to solidify its role regarding a newly acquired competence, and the
possibility of having to pay compensation-may help explain why the
Commission is not willing to leave the proceedings up to the more
informal and ad hoc mechanisms which have worked relatively well
in WTO cases.
The first draft of the Proposed Regulation, put forward by the
Commission, bears the signs of these ambitions. It claimed exclusive
competence over all aspects of foreign investment, including the more
contentious issue of portfolio investments. It ensured a far-reaching
role for the Commission in the conduct of dispute settlement, from
discretion in choosing to be respondent, through the choice of strategy
(including decisions to settle), to the apportionment of financial
responsibility. These are understandable choices from the perspective

Press Release, Council of the European Union, 3266th Council Meeting:
214.
http://www
Foreign Affairs - Trade Items, 10 (Oct. 18, 2013), available 6at
2
39
0 .pdf [http://
.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cmsData/docs/pressData/EN/foraff/1
perma.cc/TL7L-LRVD] (archived Sept. 14, 2014) (provisional version; last visited Jan.
3, 2014) (noting the importance of the Proposed Regulation on managing financial
responsibility in EU arbitrations).
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of developing a common EU investment policy. However, considering
that it will often be the Member State who has to bear (at least part
of) the financial responsibility of a case in which it could not defend
itself, some of the proposal's provisions were too far-reaching. As
such, it is little surprise that many of them have been softened
through amendments included in the Regulation.
The contours of the proposed framework are nonetheless clear.
Most notably, while it sets the origin of the treatment complained of
as the basis for both respondent status and apportionment of
compensation, it chooses the criterion of competence for deciding
responsibility. This "mismatch" of treatment and competence in
different aspects of the case may result in a situation where the
respondent is not the actor whose responsibility is in question. This,
while posing an interesting procedural issue, may cause problems
when it comes to implementing remedies other than compensation
(such as restitution of property). Furthermore, competence as the
basis of responsibility is far from established in international law.
Case law involving the EU shows a mixed picture, but-in the
absence of a provision in the IIA's arbitration clause on how to
determine responsibility-it is likely that the WTO's pragmatism and
its receptiveness to the "executive federalism" argument will prove
instructive for tribunals. Finally, the internal apportionment criteria
are based on sound logic, except for placing the financial burden on
the individual Member State when the latter is complying with new
EU-wide legislation pursuant to new competences. This is no small
matter, considering that the EU gains new competences with
virtually every new treaty between the Member States. That said, the
Member State can always seek revision of the apportionment at the
EU's Court of Justice.
The swift adoption of the Regulation by the European
Parliament and the Council of the EU is certainly to be welcomed as
the first EU investment agreements are in the process of being
finalized, and it has become increasingly pressing to have a
framework in place. With the conclusion of these new agreements,
and the subsequent flow of arbitrations, it will be intriguing to see
how the system developed by the Regulation works in practice. The
EU is a global player, and major deals ahead-such as those with the
United States, China, or India-are likely to influence the settlement
of investor-State (and investor-EU) disputes for many years to come.

